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Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings

His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI

Monday, 11 January 2010

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

This traditional meeting at the beginning of the year, two weeks after the celebration of the birth of the Incarnate Word, is a very joyful occasion for me. As we proclaimed in the liturgy: "We recognize in Christ the revelation of your love. No eye can see his glory as our God, yet now he is seen as one like us. Christ is your Son before all ages, yet now he is born in time. He has come to lift up all things to himself, to restore unity to creation" (Preface of Christmas II). At Christmas we contemplated the mystery of God and the mystery of creation: by the message of the angels to the shepherds, we received the good news of man's salvation and the renewal of the entire universe. That is why, in my Message for the 2010 World Day of Peace, I urged all persons of good will – those same men and women to whom the angels rightly promised peace – to protect creation. In the same spirit of joy I am happy to greet each of you today, particularly those present for the first time at this ceremony. I thank you most heartily for the good wishes conveyed to me by your Dean, Ambassador Alejandro Valladares Lanza, and I repeat how much I esteem your mission to the Holy See. Through you I send cordial greetings and good wishes for peace and happiness to the leaders and people of the countries which

you worthily represent. My thoughts also go to all the other nations of the earth: the Successor of Peter keeps his door open to everyone in the hope of maintaining relations which can contribute to the progress of the human family. It is a cause for deep satisfaction that, just a few weeks ago, full diplomatic relations were established between the Holy See and the Russian Federation. The recent visit of the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was likewise very significant; Vietnam is a country close to my heart, where the Church is celebrating her centuries-long presence by a Jubilee Year. In this spirit of openness, throughout 2009 I met many political leaders from all over the world; I also visited some of them and would like to continue to do so, insofar as is possible.

The Church is open to everyone because, in God, she lives for others! She thus shares deeply in the fortunes of humanity, which in this new year continues to be marked by the dramatic crisis of the global economy and consequently a serious and widespread social instability. In my Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, I invited everyone to look to the deeper causes of this situation: in the last analysis, they are to be found in a current self-centred and materialistic way of thinking which fails to acknowledge the limitations inherent in every creature. Today I would like to stress that the same way of thinking also endangers creation. Each of us could probably cite an example of the damage that this has caused to the environment the world over. I will offer an example, from any number of others, taken from the recent history of Europe. Twenty years ago, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the materialistic and atheistic regimes which had for several decades dominated a part of this continent, was it not easy to assess the great harm which an economic system lacking any reference to the truth about man had done not only to the dignity and freedom of individuals and

peoples, but to nature itself, by polluting soil, water and air? The denial of God distorts the freedom of the human person, yet it also devastates creation. It follows that the protection of creation is not principally a response to an aesthetic need, but much more to a moral need, in as much as nature expresses a plan of love and truth which is prior to us and which comes from God.

For this reason I share the growing concern caused by economic and political resistance to combatting the degradation of the environment. This problem was evident even recently, during the XV Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Copenhagen from 7 to 18 December last. I trust that in the course of this year, first in Bonn and later in Mexico City, it will be possible to reach an agreement for effectively dealing with this question. The issue is all the more important in that the very future of some nations is at stake, particularly some island states.

It is proper, however, that this concern and commitment for the environment should be situated within the larger framework of the great challenges now facing mankind. If we wish to build true peace, how can we separate, or even set at odds, the protection of the environment and the protection of human life, including the life of the unborn? It is in man's respect for himself that his sense of responsibility for creation is shown. As Saint Thomas Aquinas has taught, man represents all that is most noble in the universe (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 3). Furthermore, as I noted during the recent FAO World Summit on Food Security, "the world has enough food for all its inhabitants" (Address of 16 November 2009, No. 2) provided that selfishness does not lead some to hoard the goods which are intended for all.

I would like to stress again that the protection of creation calls for an appropriate management of the natural resources of different countries and, in the first place, of those which are economically disadvantaged. I think of the continent of Africa, which I had the joy of visiting last March during my journey to Cameroon and Angola, and which was the subject of the deliberations of the recent Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops. The Synod Fathers pointed with concern to the erosion and desertification of large tracts of arable land as a result of overexploitation and environmental pollution (cf. Propositio 22). In Africa, as elsewhere, there is a need to make political and economic decisions which ensure "forms of agricultural and industrial production capable of respecting creation and satisfying the primary needs of all" (Message for the 2010 World Day of Peace, No. 10).

How can we forget, for that matter, that the struggle for access to natural resources is one of the causes of a number of conflicts, not least in Africa, as well as a continuing threat elsewhere? For this reason too, I forcefully repeat that to cultivate peace, one must protect creation! Furthermore, there are still large areas, for example in Afghanistan or in some countries of Latin America, where agriculture is unfortunately still linked to the production of narcotics, and is a not insignificant source of employment and income. If we want peace, we need to preserve creation by rechanneling these activities; I once more urge the international community not to become resigned to the drug trade and the grave moral and social problems which it creates.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the protection of creation is indeed an important element of peace and justice! Among the many challenges which it presents, one of the most serious is increased military spending and the cost of maintaining and developing nuclear arsenals. Enormous resources are being consumed for

these purposes, when they could be spent on the development of peoples, especially those who are poorest. For this reason I firmly hope that, during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to be held this May in New York, concrete decisions will be made towards progressive disarmament, with a view to freeing our planet from nuclear arms. More generally, I deplore the fact that arms production and export helps to perpetuate conflicts and violence, as in Darfur, in Somalia or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Together with the inability of the parties directly involved to step back from the spiral of violence and pain spawned by these conflicts, there is the apparent powerlessness of other countries and the international organizations to restore peace, to say nothing of the indifference, amounting practically to resignation, of public opinion worldwide. There is no need to insist on the extent to which such conflicts damage and degrade the environment. Finally, how can I fail to mention terrorism, which endangers countless innocent lives and generates widespread anxiety. On this solemn occasion, I would like to renew the appeal which I made during the Angelus prayer of 1 January last to all those belonging to armed groups, of whatever kind, to abandon the path of violence and to open their hearts to the joy of peace.

The grave acts of violence to which I have just alluded, combined with the scourges of poverty, hunger, natural disasters and the destruction of the environment, have helped to swell the ranks of those who migrate from their native land. Given the extent of this exodus, I wish to exhort the various civil authorities to carry on their work with justice, solidarity and foresight. Here I wish to speak in particular of the Christians of the Middle East. Beleaguered in various ways, even in the exercise of their religious freedom, they are leaving the land of their forebears, where the Church took root during the earliest centuries.

To offer them encouragement and to make them feel the closeness of their brothers and sisters in faith, I have convened for next autumn a Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops on the Middle East.

Ladies and Gentlemen, to this point I have alluded only to a few aspects of the problem of the environment. Yet the causes of the situation which is now evident to everyone are of the moral order, and the question must be faced within the framework of a great programme of education aimed at promoting an effective change of thinking and at creating new lifestyles. The community of believers can and wants to take part in this, but, for it to do so, its public role must be recognized. Sadly, in certain countries, mainly in the West, one increasingly encounters in political and cultural circles, as well in the media, scarce respect and at times hostility, if not scorn, directed towards religion and towards Christianity in particular. It is clear that if relativism is considered an essential element of democracy, one risks viewing secularity solely in the sense of excluding or, more precisely, denying the social importance of religion. But such an approach creates confrontation and division, disturbs peace, harms human ecology and, by rejecting in principle approaches other than its own, finishes in a dead end. There is thus an urgent need to delineate a positive and open secularity which, grounded in the just autonomy of the temporal order and the spiritual order, can foster healthy cooperation and a spirit of shared responsibility. Here I think of Europe, which, now that the Lisbon Treaty has taken effect, has entered a new phase in its process of integration, a process which the Holy See will continue to follow with close attention. Noting with satisfaction that the Treaty provides for the European Union to maintain an "open, transparent and regular" dialogue with the Churches (Art. 17), I express my hope that in building its future, Europe

will always draw upon the wellsprings of its Christian identity. As I said during my Apostolic Visit last September to the Czech Republic, Europe has an irreplaceable role to play "for the formation of the conscience of each generation and the promotion of a basic ethical consensus that serves every person who calls this continent 'home' " (Meeting with Political and Civil Authorities and with the Diplomatic Corps,, 26 September 2009).

To carry our reflection further, we must remember that the problem of the environment is complex; one might compare it to a multifaceted prism. Creatures differ from one another and can be protected, or endangered, in different ways, as we know from daily experience. One such attack comes from laws or proposals which, in the name of fighting discrimination, strike at the biological basis of the difference between the sexes. I am thinking, for example, of certain countries in Europe or North and South America. Saint Columban stated that: "If you take away freedom, you take away dignity" (Ep. 4 ad Attela, inS. Columbani Opera, Dublin, 1957, p. 34). Yet freedom cannot be absolute, since man is not himself God, but the image of God, God's creation. For man, the path to be taken cannot be determined by caprice or willfulness, but must rather correspond to the structure willed by the Creator.

The protection of creation also entails other challenges, which can only be met by international solidarity. I think of the natural disasters which this past year have sown death, suffering and destruction in the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Taiwan. Nor can I pass over Indonesia and, closer to us, the Abruzzi region, hit by devastating earthquakes. Faced with events like these, generous aid should never be lacking, since the life itself of God's children is at stake. Yet, in addition to solidarity, the protection of creation also calls for concord and stability between states. Whenever disagreements and conflicts

arise among them, in order to defend peace they must tenaciously pursue the path of constructive dialogue. This is what happened twenty-five years ago with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile, reached thanks to the mediation of the Apostolic See. That Treaty has borne abundant fruit in cooperation and prosperity which have in some way benefited all of Latin America. In this same area of the world, I am pleased by the rapprochement upon which Columbia and Ecuador have embarked after several months of tension. Closer to us, I am gratified by the agreement concluded between Croatia and Slovenia on arbitration regarding their sea and land borders. I am also pleased by the accord between Armenia and Turkey for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, and I express my hope that, through dialogue, relations will improve among all the countries of the southern Caucasus. In the course of my pilgrimage to the Holy Land, I urgently appealed to the Israelis and the Palestinians to dialogue and to respect each others' rights. Once again I call for a universal recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist and to enjoy peace and security within internationally recognized borders. Likewise, the right of the Palestinian people to a sovereign and independent homeland, to live in dignity and to enjoy freedom of movement, ought to be recognized. I would also like to request the support of everyone for the protection of the identity and sacred character of Jerusalem, and of its cultural and religious heritage, which is of universal value. Only thus will this unique city, holy yet deeply afflicted, be a sign and harbinger of that peace which God desires for the whole human family. Out of love for the dialogue and peace which protect creation, I exhort the government leaders and the citizens of Iraq to overcome their divisions and the temptation to violence and intolerance, in order to build together the future of their country. The Christian

communities also wish to make their own contribution, but if this is to happen, they need to be assured respect, security and freedom. Pakistan has been also hard hit by violence in recent months and certain episodes were directly aimed at the Christian minority. I ask that everything be done to avoid the reoccurrence of such acts of aggression, and to ensure that Christians feel fully a part of the life of their country. In speaking of acts of violence against Christians, I cannot fail to mention also the deplorable attack which the Egyptian Coptic community suffered in recent days, during its celebration of Christmas. Concerning Iran, I express my hope that through dialogue and cooperation joint solutions will be found on the national as well as the international level. I encourage Lebanon, which has emerged from a lengthy political crisis, to continue along the path of concord. I hope that Honduras, after a period of uncertainty and unrest, will move towards a recovery of normal political and social life. I desire the same for Guinea and Madagascar with the effective and disinterested aid of the international community.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at the end of this rapid overview which, due to its brevity, cannot mention every situation worthy of note, I am reminded of the words of the Apostle Paul, for whom "all creation groans and is in agony" and "we ourselves groan inwardly" (Rom 8:20-23). There is so much suffering in our world, and human selfishness continues in many ways to harm creation. For this reason, the yearning for salvation which affects all creation is that much more intense and present in the hearts of all men and women, believers and non-believers alike. The Church points out that the response to this aspiration is Christ "the firstborn of all creation, for in him all things in heaven and on earth were created" (Col 1:15-16). Looking to him, I exhort every person of good will to work confidently and generously for the sake of human dignity and freedom. May the

light and strength of Jesus help us to respect human ecology, in the knowledge that natural ecology will likewise benefit, since the book of nature is one and indivisible. In this way we will be able to build peace, today and for the sake of generations to come. To all I wish a Happy New Year!

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Efficiency of the Anti-crisis Program and the Main Priorities for Post-crisis Development of Uzbekistan

H.E. Rustam Azimov (*First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan*)

Dear participants of the Conference!

Almost a year has passed since we had previous International Conference in Tashkent «The Global Financial-Economic Crisis, Ways and Measures to Overcome it in the Conditions of Uzbekistan», within the framework of which we had very fruitful discussions of various issues, exchanged views and developed recommendations on mitigating the negative impact of the global financial and economic crisis on national economies around the world.

Today, on the basis of the results of the work undertaken in 2009 within the framework of the Anti-Crisis Program of Uzbekistan, we would like to conduct an objective evaluation of the Anti-Crisis Program, discuss the priorities of the post-crisis development using the example of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The time has proved the correctness of conclusions of the last-year's International Conference in Tashkent, particularly, in regard to the statement that the depth of impact of the global crisis on individual countries and regions of the world significantly differs depending on models of economic development that had been implemented during the years preceding the crisis as well as results of the anti-crisis actions.

It is well known that the market economy always follows cyclical development and it is impossible to avoid downturns. It means that economies have to get prepared for those downturns

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in advance through conducting the balanced economic policy, which is based not on revenues from speculative operations in commodity and stock-exchange markets, but on fundamental factors of the economic growth.

Crises test efficiency of a model of economic policy that had been implemented by a government for many years prior to the crisis. The chosen strategy shall take into account long-term factors of economic growth, interests of future generations, economic and social security of the country, and shall never depend on the world prices for raw material resources.

As it was mentioned by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov during the meeting at the Cabinet of Ministers on the results of the social and economic development of the country in 2009: «The year 2009 has become a genuine test, firstly, of the «Uzbek model» that we have chosen for transition from the old command-administrative, distributive system to the market system of governance built on the five principles and strategy of consistent, step-by-step reforms and evolutionary development of state and economy.»

In my presentation I would like to elaborate on three main blocks of issues:

1. Economic policy of Uzbekistan and its results during the period preceding the crisis.

2. Impact of the crisis, its merit, contents and preliminary results of implementing the Anti-crisis program of Uzbekistan.

3. Vision on priorities of the post-crisis development.

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Speaking about the «Uzbek model», let me reveal, once more, the main five principles of transition to the socially-oriented market economy developed by President Islam Karimov:

1. **The priority of economics over politics.** Economic reforms should never be submitted to any ideology and should be free of all dogmas, postulates and outdated stereotypes;

2. **State is the principal reformer.** It should designate the main priorities, directions and stages of reforms, design national programs of development and consistently implement them;

3. **Supremacy of law in all aspects of life of the society.** Everyone without exception should abide by the democratically adopted Constitution and enacted laws;

4. **Implementation of a strong social policy.** Introduction of the free market relations should be followed up by effective measures directed to ensure a reliable social protection of the population, in particular of the families in need and with several children, and elderly;

5. **Transition to the market relations is undertaken along the evolutionary path,** taking into account objective economic laws, gradually, thoughtfully, from one stage to another.

In General, thanks to the commitment to those five key principles of transition to the socially oriented market economy, the Republic of Uzbekistan has managed to ensure macroeconomic stability and balance of internal and external sectors of the economy, which are characterized as follows:

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- a moderately tight monetary policy kept inflation below 7-8%;
- balanced state budget.



Figure 1

I think that the issue of a balanced state budget is the key one not only for developing but also for many of the developed countries as well. And at this time, when even many developed countries have deficits in their state budgets, which is close to or even exceed 10% of their GDPs, as a Minister of Finance, I think that it is a disaster for the government. In our country, since 2005 the state budget is executed with surplus. We always match expenditures of our country with revenues;

- balanced foreign trade – sustainable surplus and over 6-times growth of the official reserves in the past 5 years;
- conservative policy of domestic and external borrowing. Total public external debt as of 01.01.2010 is equal to 9.5% of GDP and does not exceed 26% of total exports.

As you know, many countries, including members of the European Union, have their external debts exceeding 100% of GDP, while allowed level is 60%. On this issue we are conducting a conservative policy, and our foreign debt, as it was mentioned above, does not exceed 10%. Internal debt is another important factor. And here again I can assert that from the first days of independence our country was not fan of borrowing in the internal market and today our internal debt is equal to 0.6% of GDP.



Figure 2

We have to point out that the ongoing structural reforms create conditions for sustained high rates of economic growth (7-8% per annum on average), increase of the share of industries from 14% in 1992 to 24% in 2009, stable increase of the population's income at the level of 22-24% per annum and growth of the domestic demand for goods and services due to the high investment rates (25% per annum on average), mostly from domestic sources and promotion of active development of small businesses, whose share rose up to 50% of GDP.

For the years of Independence the aggregate tax burden decreased by almost 3 times. Moreover, the Government provides additional tax incentives for exporters, small business enterprises and companies engaged in new investments, in modernization of and technical re-equipment of existing capacities and starting new goods and products.

Taxes	1998	2010	Decrease
Corporate income tax	35%	09%	4 times
Personal income tax	25%–45%	11%–22%	2 times
Single social payment	40%	25%	1.8 times
Dividend tex	15%	10%	1.5 times

Table 1

We can state that Uzbekistan has created a stable banking and financial system in strict compliance with the Basel Core principles of banking supervision. Bank capital adequacy ratio is over 23%, being almost 3 times higher than international standards, total assets of banks are more than 2 times higher than the total balance of the population and legal entities deposits, insuring complete protection and guarantee of timely payments, and total current liquidity of the banking system is 10 times higher than external payments due. At the same time, for the last 10 years domestic sources channeled to financing the real sector of the economy increased by 25 times, which in turn contributed to decrease of external borrowings in the structure of credit portfolios of commercial banks.

I would like to underline that implementation of an active investment policy, technical modernization of industries and industrial infrastructure that have contributed to establishment



Figure 3

of new high-tech industries, such as car industry, petrochemical industry, electrical engineering, oil and gas machinery, railway machinery, textile industry, construction materials industry, pharmaceuticals, furniture production.

Thus, during the years of independence new automobile factories were established to manufacture cars jointly with «GM» (U.S.) in Asaka, buses with «Isuzu» (Japan) and trucks with «MAN» (Germany) in the city of Samarkand. In cooperation with the leading foreign companies a number of new factories were launched such as Bukhara petroleum refinery in cooperation with «Technip» (France), Shurtan gas and chemical complex in cooperation with «ABB», Kungrad soda plant in cooperation with «CITIC» (China) and dozens of textile factories.

A new railway Tashguzar–Boysun–Kumkurgan was built in cooperation with «JBIC» (Japan), which is 223 km long and goes through a mountainous route with attitude of 1500 m

and reaches Northern borders of Afghanistan. New sections of Navoi–Uchkuduk–Sultanuizdag–Nukus railway were launched that have bridges over Amudarya River.



Figure 4

We have built dozens of textile factories in our country. Thus, if in the early years of independence we reproduced about 7% of our cotton in the country, today we reproduce more than 30% of our cotton, generate value added and increase our export potential.

Another important factor of the social and economic development of Uzbekistan is the implementation of National Personnel Training Program, within the framework of which, since 1996, a new education system has been established. And

this system consists of 1,508 new academic lyceums and professional colleges, with the capacity of 1.1 million students, 9,787 renovated and newly constructed comprehensive schools for 4.3 million students.

Today, we have 66 institutions of higher education are functioning in the Republic with more than 300 thousand students. Moreover, our young generation, without leaving the country, can study at the world's famous universities such as Moscow State University, Westminster International University, Turin Polytechnic Institute, Management Development Institute of Singapore, Russian State University of Oil and Gas and many others that have established their branches in Uzbekistan.

Now allow me to elaborate on the key measures within the Anti-crisis program of Uzbekistan that ensure stable and continuous functioning of our financial and economic, budgetary, monetary systems that provide practical support to the real sector of the economy and social support to the population of the country.

We can't say that the global financial and economic crisis did not affect our economy. First of all, impact of the crisis was evident on the sharp decrease of world's prices for the main export commodities of Uzbekistan such as cotton fiber, cotton yarn, chemicals and fertilizers, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, which have suddenly dropped and the range of decline varied from 30% up to by 3.5 times for various commodities.

In this regard, one of the key measures of the Anti-crisis program of Uzbekistan was aimed at **support of and ensuring stable functioning of exporting companies,** implementation of which in 2009 resulted in:

- reduction of industrial production cost by 18% on average that improved financial position of enterprises and enhanced their competitiveness on external markets;

- 50 exporting enterprises benefited from restructuring of bank loans for technical modernization, and of debt to the budget for the total amount of more than USD 200 million;

- commercial banks provided additional loans for the amount of USD 160 million to replenish the working capital of exporting enterprises;

- the increase of tariffs for basic utilities (electricity, natural gas, water, sewerage), which in 2007 and 2008 averaged 24.6% per annum, in 2009 was limited to 7.7%.

As a result, in 2009, not only exports were refrained from decline, but also significant surplus of the trade balance was achieved at the level of 11% of the total foreign trade.

Within the framework of the second package of the Anti-crisis measures, targeted to promote investment activity growth and expand resources for investment in the enterprises of the real sector of economy, the following measures were implemented in 2009:

- the total capital of commercial banks has grown by 43%. The authorized capital of Microcredit Bank, People's Bank, Agrobank, Asakabank and Qishloq Qurilish bank increased

Dynamics of foreign trade indicators in 2005-2009. USD mln.



Figure 5

by eq. USD 400 million from state resources with the purpose of subsequent allocation of these funds to financing the real sector of the economy;

- commercial banks issued eq. USD 1.6 billion of loans for financing modernization, technical and technological reequipment projects. The volume of investment loans of the banks increased by 60% compared to 2008.

- in 2009, 690 investment projects with total amount of USD 5.2 billion were under implementation, out of which 303

projects with total amount of USD 1.9 billion were successfully completed.



Figure 6

As a result of those projects, aggregated capital of commercial banks has increased by 43% in 2009, while the volume of investment credits of the banks recorded an increase by 60%. The volume of investments in the economy amounted to USD 8.2 billion, which is 25% higher than in 2008. The major share of these investments are direct investments that increased by 1.8 times.

22 large production facilities were put into operation. In building materials industry, light industry and food industry over 480 new small businesses have been created.

217 km of new roads have been constructed, 538 km of roads and 19 bridges have been repaired. «Novoangren–Uzbekistan» (165 km) and «Guzar–Surkhan» (217 km) 500 kV Power transmission lines, as well as «Ahangaran-Pungan» gas pipeline (165 km) have been launched. 5 railway bridges on «Tashguzar–Boysun–Kumkurgan» railway, 6 new passing tracks on «Navoi–Uchkuduk–Sultanuizdag=-Nukus» railway have been put into operation. Electrification of 114 km of Tashkent-Angren railways is on completion stage.

In the framework of implementing the third package of measures **on non-inflationary stimulation of internal demand for domestically produced goods and services** the followings were achieved:

- within the framework of localization program production of more than 120 types of new goods by 62 companies was set up resulting in increase of production volume by 2.3 times and amounting to USD 1.9 billion;

- 906 entities specialized on turnkey construction, reconstruction and repair of housing created and freed from all types of tax payments for the period of 5 years;

- 152 new enterprises created for the production of modern roofing and wall materials, including 68 enterprises producing bricks with the total capacity of more than 330 million units per year;

- 1,029 greenhouses with the total area of 585.8 ha built to operate using alternative energy sources;

As a result of those measures, in 2009, real income of population grew by 26.5%, wages – by 40%, retail trade – by 16.6%, services – by 16.7%.

A separate package of Anti-crisis measures are aimed at **modernization of the power industry, introduction of the system for reducing energy intensity of the economy and saving energy.** Within this package the implementation of the modern combined-cycle power plants construction projects in Tashkent, Navoi and Talimarjan Power plants, and Tashkent heat station with the total capacity of 1730 MWt and total investments of USD 1.9 billion was started and is under way. The Automatic electricity control and accounting system worth USD 450 million; installation of 570 thousand units of modern electronic electricity metering devices were introduced.

20 projects were initiated with the CDM-component (under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol), including 8 projects to reduce gas leakages in gas distribution networks and compressor stations. 7 CDM projects were registered with UNFC.

In implementation of the **measures to strengthen support of small businesses, implementation of additional measures to increase employment and create new jobs,** in 2009 a single tax rate for small business and microfirms in the industrial sector was reduced from 8% to 7%.

The volume of loans extended by commercial banks to small businesses increased by 1.5 times compared to 2008 and amounted to more than eq USD 1.2 billion. The volume of credit lines of the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, German Development Bank (KfW), the Government of China and financial institutions for small businesses increased to USD 171 million from USD 105 million in 2008.

As a result, in 2009, more than 940 thousand new jobs created, including 390 thousand jobs in small business.

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Summarizing the results of the package of measures within the Anti-crisis program of Uzbekistan we can answer the question of «**What were the achievements of Uzbekistan in 2009?**» by asserting the followings:

1. Macroeconomic stability;

2. High rates of economic growth;

3. Continued structural reforms aimed at modernization and technical re-equipment of the economy;

4. Increased employment.

5. Growth of real income of the population.

At the same time, efficiency of the Anti-crisis program of Uzbekistan in the fiscal and monetary policies is characterized by the followings:

- there were no cases of loss of liquidity and bank failures, increase of bad loans. 14 commercial banks, whose aggregate assets constitute more than 90% of the banking system, received in 2009 a stable international rating by the leading rating companies – «Fitch Ratings», «Moody's» and «Standard & Poor's»;

- there was no reduction in credit activity of banks. The volume of loans provided by banks to the economy grew by 1.4 times, including lending to small businesses – by 1.7 times;

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- there was no outflow of funds from the banking system, the volume of household deposits increased during the year by 1.7 times.

- stable performance of financial, commodity markets and real estate market. The economy avoided formation and collapse of artificial «bubbles»;

- the budget funds were not used to cover the debts of banks and enterprises. State budget was executed with a surplus equal to 0.2% of GDP;

- the country did not enter in urgent borrowings in foreign markets to support the balance of payments, cover the budget deficit and address other urgent needs.

Today, one of the main issues in front of many countries in the world lies in developing the measures for accelerated restoration of national economies that are affected by negative impact of the global financial and economic crisis, and coming up with the measures for porstcrisis development.

In consideration of the current condition of the economy of Uzbekistan, which was mainly ensured due to the efficiency of the adopted and implemented measures of the Anti-crisis program, the key priorities of the post-crisis development of Uzbekistan consist of the followings:

1. **Creation of a managed model of macroeconomic development,** which ensures balanced macroeconomic proportions, optimal ratio of internal and external demand, sustained high economic growth rates of at least 7% per year.

2. **Creation of conditions for continuous modernization, technical and technological re-equipment of production,** implementation of structural reforms on the basis of:

- priority development of industries with high added value – car production, petrochemical, gas-chemical, electrical, chemical industry, building materials;
- development of labor-intensive industries with competitive advantages for provision of employment – textiles, footwear, food industries;
- introduction of innovations aimed at continuous increase in competitiveness of the national economy and growth of the export potential;
- further geographical and product diversification of exports.

Industries	**Project Cost** USD bln	**Structure** % of total cost of projects
Total, incl.:	**55.4**	**100%**
Oil and gas	15.3	27.6%
Petrochemical	12.1	21.8%
Transport and infrastructure	7.5	13.6%
Energy sector	5.8	10.5%
Chemical	5.6	10.1%
Metals and mining	4.4	7.9%
Textile	1.9	3.4%
Machine building	1.4	2.5%
Construction materials	0.8	1.4%
Others	0.6	1.1%

Table 2 The Program of implementation of the priority investment projects for 2009–2014

3. **Functioning of healthy banking and finance system,** which supports the growth of investments, development and continuous modernization of the real sector of the economy, ensures broad access of the population to credit resources and financial mechanisms for increasing employment, prevents the use of financial resources to create different types of «bubbles».

In order to achieve those goals we have set the following objectives:

- increase of the total bank capital, its growth in 2010 by not less than 20%, with increasing its share in the coming years to not less than 10% of GDP;
- growth of long-term bank deposits by at least 30%;
- increase in long-term investment credits in the economy mainly through domestic sources.

4. **Increasing the share of private sector in the economy through:**

- active support and further development of small business;
- creating conditions for establishment of modern, hi-tech enterprises, dynamically reacting to the situation on domestic and foreign markets; accelerated development of the services, mainly in transport and communications, tourism and hotel services, as well as trade and consumer services in rural areas.

In 2009, we expect to bring the share of small business in GDP to 52.5% from 48.2% in 2008, and the share of services in GDP 0.2em– to 49% from 45.3% in 2008.

5. **Creating a modern, efficient agricultural production, ensuring:**

- sustainable food supply for the population;
- timely and effective implementation of irrigation and melioration, increase of soil quality and fertility;
- stimulation of the development of farms, equipped with modern equipment and advanced technologies of agricultural production.

6. **Provision of further growth of rural population incomes** that contributes to transformation of the external appearance and quality of life of the village, establishment of a modern rural housing and rural infrastructure, based on the most modern standards for urban settlements.

In order to achieve those goals, in 2010, we have planned the construction of new all-inclusive residential communities in all 159 districts of the country - construction of 7,630 houses worth more than USD 390 million, mainly through soft mortgage loans.

7. **Development of production, transport and social infrastructure** in accordance with the objectives of economic growth and ensuring the needs of the population through:

- development of the modern network of highways that comply with international standards, including in terms of a transit capacities. In this regards, a large-scale program on construction and reconstruction of Uzbekistan's national

highways was started, which comply with the high international standards, reliably interconnects all regions of the country and ensures access to regional and world markets;

- development of modern electrified railways with the length of 460 km in the direction of Marokand-Karshi-Tashguzar-Baysun-Kumkurgan and 250 km in the direction of Marokand-Navoi-Bukhara;

- upgrade of the rolling stock, including purchase of 2 high-speed passenger electric trains «Talgo-250», 15 passenger locomotives, 11 diesel locomotives, 10 sections of freight locomotives and the construction of over 2 thousand freight cars

- expansion of the air fleet (purchase of 10 «A-320», 4 «Boeing-767» and 2 «Boeing-787» aircrafts) and development of modern airports (reconstruction and modernization of the international airport of the city of Navoi.

- development of international logistics center in Navoi, logistics center in Angren city, «Navoi» Free Industrial Economic Zone.

8. **Creation of a modern social sector, enabling harmonious development of the population, training the young generation** through:

- high levels of education, creating the most modern systems of education and training;

- creating an effective system for maintaining a healthy lifestyle, disease prevention and treatment;

- development of material and technical base of physical culture and sports, promotion of their popularity, especially among children and youth;

- create conditions for involvement of people in music, arts and theatrical creativity.

I have to underline that Uzbekistan promulgated 2010 as Year of Harmoniously Developed Generation, and the national program on this regard envisages the mobilization of resources and capacities into creation of all necessary conditions to ensure that the youth of Uzbekistan grow up not only in good physical and spiritual health, but also being harmoniously developed individuals, holding modern intellectual knowledge, who can fully meet the requirements of the 21st century, in which they will have to live and work.

In order to implement the Program, it is envisaged to allocate about 8 trillion soum, including 1.8 trillion soum of public funds.

Thus, these are the priorities of that we have set in front of us for the post-crisis development, and we hope that in today's discussion we will be able to study all issues, listen to your views and your recommendations.

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Mathematics as a Formal Ontology: the Hermeneutical Dimension of Natural Sciences and Eastern Patristic

Alexei Chernyakov

Preface

For several years *St. Petersburg Educational Centre for Religion and Science* (SPECRS) in Russia has been striving to provide a sphere where scholars, theologians and philosophers can combine their efforts to find a language and a way of posing problems which would transcend epistemological specifics of individual branches of research and would at the same time try to answer some of the most profound questions of human existence.

In the 20th century Russia had run through a very dramatic period in its history and endured extremely violent ideological censorship in many spheres of culture. As a consequence many Russian intellectuals suffer from an inability (and sometimes a determined refusal) to reconcile theoretical interests and their religious life. We think that discussions on the theme of science and faith or science and theology or religion could help to clarify the nature of this contradiction and the actual extent to which it is rooted in Russian culture. There is no other way to overcome this contradiction, but to cooperate and to reflect openly in a common space doing joint work and making collaborative efforts. This common space is herein called the *hermeneutical problem in science and theology,* and this is the cause to which SPECRS has dedicated itself to helping create.

The following article develops the ideas of our joint paper with Dr. Natalia Pecherskaya *The Nature of the Science and*

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Religion Dialogue in Russia and Its Basic Grounds presented at Metanexus/LSI Annual Conference 2004.

Hermeneutics – Methodological and Existential

Hermeneutics in the traditional sense is a way – or probably *the* way – of interpreting textual material. According to theology, it has been long understood that a text (and particularly a holy text) never 'speaks by itself'. A holy text is always a relation between the divine author and the human reader (listener) which includes an inevitable sequence or series of mediations made up of (not divine, but) human compiler(s) of the texts, i.e. scribes and interpreters who depend on historical and cultural contexts. *Hermeneutics* deals with the role and the limits of these mediations, and it studies possible approaches to the text and various ways of understanding it and revealing its fundamental meanings. Hermeneutics existed before Christ and continues to exist after Christ; the hermeneutical tradition is more than 2000 years old. The term itself comes from the Greek *hermeneuo,* meaning *I interpret, I explain*. Within this tradition we observe different and sometimes conflicting schools, yet there has always existed a *consensus omnium* concerning the following points.

Any difficult text meaning to be interpreted by a culture can no longer be easily understood when it is one or two centuries old. Thus, most historians who have dealt with old documents, like researchers who have turned to the original writings of their predecessors (not to modern texts which retell history in today's language, but to the original texts) know that such texts do not speak to us immediately, that serious work is needed to make such a text tell us important things in a comprehensible way. A simple reflection is enough to illustrate this point. The text of the Pentateuch of Moses is written in ancient Hebrew,

and Homer's poems in Greek. If we want to understand them at all, we need mediators, at the very least in the shape of a grammar and a dictionary. And a grammar and a dictionary are sufficiently active mediators: have accumulated a large share of 'ulterior knowledge' in order to become a bridge that lets us access a text. Yet the problem is not limited to this mediation. In ancient times there existed already schools of hermeneutics which believed that behind the 'literal' meaning we could approach using a grammar and a dictionary, there was also hiding something like an implied meaning. This implied meaning must therefore be discovered and explained. Already the oldest schools of theology, like the school of Alexandria, allowed a special kind of interpretation which was called allegorical or typological (these interpretations differ, but we shall not go into the complicated classification of various ways of interpretation in this paper). This meant that some 'other' text was read behind 'the literal meaning', with all due respect for the reading of vocabulary, grammar and syntax.

In this way we are identifying a predecessor to modern hermeneutics, the hermeneutical tradition of antiquity, which deserves a special mention in our historical view. It is worth mentioning that part of the knowledge preserved and transmitted by the Stoic school was a kind of natural science. Of course it was not a science as understood today, and yet it was a science in that it used a certain set of concepts, required well-grounded proof and developed refined logical reasoning in order to ensure the necessary soundness of reflection. And since the time of the Stoics, Homer's poems have no longer been immediately understandable, yet they remained a 'culture-shaping' basis of Hellenism, and it was thought necessary to know the Stoics in order to learn to read Homer in a certain way. Among other things the Stoics tried to interpret Homer's texts in a 'scientific' way, as a source of natural philosophy. This sets a curious

precedent for the project at hand of scientific and religious interpretation which we are currently analyzing.

Beginning with the problem of interpreting the Bible, hermeneutics later became the method characteristic of historians and then of what the Germans call the *Geisteswissenschaften* – a term which designates both the humanities and the humanistic study of culture. Later on the term 'hermeneutics' acquires a more profound – ontological – meaning in the works by Martin Heidegger. Thus, hermeneutics can be taken either as a method of inquiry in the domain of the humanities, or as an ontological approach which begins with the mode of being characteristic of human life. Following Patrick Heelan we shall call the former ("which is the art or science of interpreting explicit language or symbols") *methodological hermeneutics* while the latter will be called *existential hermeneutics*. The human way of being-in-the-world means that every act of human understanding is mediated by the integral context of human life and culture, which varies historically. Hermeneutics in this double sense is both a new method and a new starting point in philosophy. The *locus classicus* for the subject is sections 31 and 32 of Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

Let us begin with methodological hermeneutics. The process of reading, understanding, or interpreting a literary text is guided by what Heidegger calls a 'fore-structure of understanding,' that is, an anticipation about the kind of things or objects about which the text speaks. This anticipation or preliminary understanding is influenced by the whole of the linguistic, conceptual, cultural, etc. historical horizon within which the interpreter is situated.

The interpreter must have a certain initial background interest in the text, the pursuit of this interest brings a focus to the chase, it provides it with a definite structure antecedent to all found answers, and it provides a criterion of success for the

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results of the inquiry. It determines 'in what direction' the text is to be interpreted, to what conceptual or symbolic plane the results must be projected.

Because the result of an interpretation, that is, the final understanding of a text, is already premised on this preliminary anticipation of its meaning one encounters here a certain circle in sense-emergence, which is called a 'hermeneutical circle' and differs drastically from the *circulus vitiosus* (vicious circle). In it

> is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having (*Vorgriff*), fore-sight (*Vorsicht*), and fore-conception (*Vorgfiff*) to be presented to us by fancies and popular conception, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.

It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that for Heidegger the process of understanding-interpreting a text is only an analogy or a prefiguration of a fundamental structure of human being in the world, that is, a constituent of what he calls the "fundamental ontology" and conceives as the basement on which the whole edifice of ontology should be built.

The structure of interests against the background of unquestioned knowledge H.-G. Gadamer calls 'the prejudice structure,' that is the structure of presumptions. Such a structure, insists Gadamer, is not a mark of unavoidable defect; to the contrary, it is necessary for any inquiry (at least in the sphere of the humanities) and a productive thing if subordinated to a certain methodical discipline and open to criticism and revision.

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The most principal for our line of argument and the most contentious question is *whether scientific enquiry also posses hermeneutical features* and has to be analyzed within the framework of a hermeneutical situation. The 'fathers' of philosophical hermeneutics themselves used to oppose – in this respect – natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) to the humanities (or *Geisteswissenschaften*). Science, according to this tradition, dealt with facts rather than texts and sought for explanations (in terms of other facts, concepts and theories) rather than in terms of what they signified for human life and history. Even the 'text of science' differs from all other texts specifically in that it is read in a completely unambiguous, rational way and offers no room for interpretation in the sense of hermeneutical procedures with all their indeterminate moves and choices. The generally accepted notion of natural scientists is that science does not interpret – it 'describes' and 'explains' *facts*, those natural phenomena of experience that are repeatedly and unquestionably 'observed' during scientific research. Science, and mathematics all the more, according to this understanding, is not and need not be, hermeneutically involved.

Nevertheless, among the contemporary philosophers of science there are some advocates of the view that there is a hermeneutical dimension to natural sciences. I would like to mention first of all the name of Patrick Heelan, who, according to my vision, brings out clearly in his works how deeply hermeneutics is implicated in the scientific process.

Can we really detect the presence of the fore-structure of understanding and of the hermeneutical circle in the scientific research? It seems that the answer must be positive. The fore-structure of understanding, according to Heidegger, has three parts: (1) *Vorsicht*, here a common conceptual system, a set of descriptive categories, a common descriptive language, as it were, (2) *Vorhabe*, a set of praxes, embodiments, skills, and so forth that

mediate between the descriptive categories and that to which they refer, and (3) *Vorgriff*, a particular hypothesis about the subject matter in hand. But is it possible to speak about a 'hermeneutical circle' within a scientific enquiry?

Conceptual Schemes

Let me at the moment set up a detour and to approach the same problem not from within continental philosophy but, this time, being guided by recent philosophizing about the so called conceptual schemes within the analytic tradition. Here I have to speak in a roundabout way.

According to a particular tradition that goes back at least as far as J.S. Mill's *System of Logic* (if not as far as Aristotle's *Second Analytics*), a scientific explanation must have the form of a logical deduction starting from the general theses of a theory (i.e. the 'laws of nature') which function as 'explanatory knowledge' (*explanans*) and arrive (as the last link in a logically deductive chain) at the description of a given fact which must be 'explained' (*explanandum*).

This form of explanation inevitably leads to certain limitations in the *language of description*. That is to say, it must include definitions of the terms used for the formulation of general laws because otherwise it is impossible to get a description of 'fact' in the form of a *logical conclusion.* This assumption is based on the most general principles of a theory and depends on its logical premises.

The following example is borrowed from the illuminating book of Roberto Torretti, titled *Creative Understanding: Philosophical Reflection on Physics* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Let us suppose that we are explaining the 'fact' that this thing (e.g. a raven, a species of bird) which I

see before me is black. Our explanation is that there is a 'law of nature' according to which all ravens are black. This is the major premise. The minor premise is: this thing here is a raven (this fact is established as 'scientific,' i.e. zoological). So when we conclude that this thing is black, what we are really explaining (in the accepted sense) is simply the original fact which must be explained. Yet in order to be able to make the conclusion, it is necessary that the description of this *explanandum* contain the same terms as the formulation of natural law. In our example this is the predicate 'black,' 'bird' and 'raven.' On the other hand, if we simply state that this thing before our eyes has wings, a nose or is warm we shall not be able to explain, using the universal 'laws of nature,' what is this.

Of course, in contemporary science 'laws' are usually formulated in terms which differ from the casually descriptive language that we use in everyday life. These terms are usually a part of the language of this or that particular scientific discipline and are defined by their position within the system. If philosophers and natural scientists had remained limited to the scope of a*natural* language, they could never have combined ideas to describe and explain within the framework of one scientific theory such facts as apples falling down, heavenly bodies moving in regular orbits and galaxies expanding.

What is the most important for us (and we shall come back to this subject later on), almost all well-developed theories today include elements of the 'preferred' and 'privileged' language as professed by Galileo and Newton; the language of mathematics. And, as we have shown, this means that the privileged language of *factual description* must be the same, i.e. mathematical. Does this not imply that certain concepts are read into facts without being the facts themselves? Does this not point to the existence of unconscious premises which determine the choice of the privileged language of science? The discovery of

these premises is one of the most important problems, which is hermeneutical in nature and of pressing concern for our contemporary situation to confront. We encounter a certain circular relationship between 'facts' and the language of their 'description': the latter strive to be neutral and just to 'mirror the facts' not violating them, it strives to adjust itself to the needs of a factual description; on the other hand the way we perceive the facts, as we believe, is to some extend pre-determined by the language of 'description'. Can we really speak here about a 'description' without violating the meaning of the word. More pointedly, we may ask:

1. Can the 'facts' remain the same as the framework ('the language', the conceptual system) of description varies?

2. Does the need for a steady (in particular, 'a-historical') reference to the 'facts' really exists in scientific research?

3. Does this need set some tough limits to the development of the language of science and conceptual innovations?

Now I move to the discussion of the 'conceptual schemes'. The notion itself can be traced back to Kant's *a priori* forms of perception and cognition in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Among other things these notions aim at establishing the permanent limits to fact-transformations and conceptual innovations. Kant was emphatic that "we cannot render in any way conceivable or comprehensible to ourselves" alternative forms of sense awareness and discursive thought, "even if they should be possible", and that "even assuming that we could do so, they would still not belong to experience, the only kind of knowledge in which objects are given to us" (A 230). The Kantian themes of forms

versus content and of an immutable all embracing order – belonging to the architecture of human mind itself and thus being immune to the historical changes of the human world, – as well as the post-Kantian theme of alternative, disposable schemes to arrange our experience, resound in some important 20th century thinkers. Let me quote some passages from W. V. Quine and Sir Peter Strawson.

> We adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, some simplest conceptual scheme into which a disordered fragments of our raw experience can be fitted and arranged. Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense. . .
>
> Certainly concepts do change, and not only, though mainly, on the specialist periphery; and even specialist changes react on ordinary thinking. But there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which in their most fundamental character change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialties of the most refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking; and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings. It is with these, their interconnections, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned.

Strawson refers to this unchanging "core of human thinking" in order to avoid the risk to run to extremes, insisting on a human power to change, as it were, the world of objects by changing the system of scientific concepts. The claim for such a power (which

may occur to be only a disguised form of helplessness in the face of the truth) looms in some H. Putnam's writings. A conceptual scheme "cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description". The ontological implications of this view are very strong:

> wrong with the notion of objects (and 'facts' as well – *A. Ch.*) existing 'independently' of conceptual schemes is that there are no standard for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices. . . We can and should insist that some facts are there to be discovered and not legislated by us. But this is something to be said when one has adopted a way of speaking, a language, a 'conceptual scheme.' To talk of 'facts' without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing; the word 'fact' no more has its use fixed by the world itself than does the word 'exist' or the word 'object'.

Finally, the following quotation borrowed from David Wiggins proposes to keep to the middle path:

> Philosophy must hold a nice balance. . . between the extent to which the concepts that we bring to bear to distinguish, articulate and individuate things in nature are something invented by us and the extent to which these concepts are something we discover and permit nature to intimate to us and inform and regulate for us.

The question is: how and by what methodological means philosophy must keep this "nice balance"? It must be confessed that I do not believe in "a massive central core of human thinking which has no history", in a set of concepts that are absolutely immune to historical change and thus provide a stable reference

to the facts. I do not think even that the existence of these immune concepts is necessary in order that, as R. Torretti formulates it, "the continuity of scientific discourse can be preserved." But neither I think that there is a sort of unrestricted conceptual 'constructivism' which obeys only intra-logical limitations and does not, in any sense, refer to the extra-logical reality. In this case the scientific community should be seen as accomplishing a kind of (first 'spiritual,' then 'technological') *creation* of the world. There is a heavy resistance to our conceptual and experimental arbitrariness from the direction of the 'things themselves', and the main task of ontology *to clarify the nature of this resistance*. Let me continue the quotation from Wiggins:

> Conceptualism properly conceived must not entail that before we got for ourselves these concepts, their extensions did not exist autonomously, i.e. independently of whether or not the concepts were destined to be fashioned and their compliants to be discovered. What conceptualism entails is only that, although horse, leaves, sun and stars are not inventions or artifacts, still, in order to single out this things, we have to deploy upon experience a conceptual scheme which has itself been fashioned or formed in such a way as to make it possible to single them out

This way to articulate the problem under consideration still looks a bit oversimplifying. At least it must be explained what does it mean that 'the extension of a concept exists autonomously or independently of the concept itself'. About *what* (what logical subject) the existence is stated? Are the sun and the stars the same object for the ancient Greeks, who worshiped them reverently as gods, for the authors of *Corpus Hermeticum*, for Copernicus who depends essentially on these texts, and for a

contemporary astronomer? Here Putnam's warning seems to be of a great importance. What are the autonomous 'facts', the observable phenomena *through which* we approach 'the' object called 'sun'?

I would like to cite in this connection an example borrowed from Norwood Russell Hanson in regard to the story of Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. Tycho Brahe, who up to his death was a firm believer in the immobility of the Earth, and his assistant Johannes Kepler, who consistently shared Copernicus' views, both observe the same sun rise. Hanson asks: Can one say that Kepler and Tycho Brahe see the same phenomenon in the East when the day breaks?

Here is one more view of the sunrise:

> Eos, the rose-fingered heraldress of the morning, found them weeping. . . (*Iliad*. 23, 109).

Are Brahe, Kepler and Homer actually observing the same 'fact'? Does not the context of this or that theory (the Greek word for theory means just 'observation') and the context of the world-at-large determine our view?

Is it possible to speak about an autonomous existence of an object X to which we ascribe in the course of history drastically different predicates, inscribing X in drastically different contexts. Is it not so that the 'sun' is only a name and the corresponding *nominatum* is nothing else that the *invariant* of the historically varied contexts of the *nomen*-usage? These manifold contexts are bound together by the relations of (sometimes mutual) interpretations, that is, by 'hermeneutical relations.' Is

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not the *existence* of the *nominatum* is nothing else than the identity of its 'hermeneutical trajectory' within the history, within variegated, historically changeable conceptual schemes?

Mathematics as a Formal Ontology

Let me proceed now to the central theme of my paper, viz. the mathematical *modus operandi* characteristic to the modern science. My immediate task is to characterize mathematics as a 'formal ontology' and to demonstrate that there is a hermeneutical dimension to mathematics itself.

Modern natural sciences in their totality claim to be a universal ontology, though this claim lies perhaps outside the proper subject of science. Even if we reduce the ontological claim of science to the modest minimum there is no doubt that science in accordance with the dominant contemporary world-outlook considers itself as a universal ontology of nature. The huge progress made by sciences since Galileo is in many respects a result of their new mathematical form. Mathematics becomes an inalienable part of the contemporary "natural philosophy". We could say that mathematics shapes the latter.

Numerous researches are devoted to the role of mathematics in natural sciences. Our question is different. If mathematics is to be thought as *the* formal ontology of nature, then it seems to be natural to assume that the analysis of 'the way of being' of mathematics itself, in particular the foundations of mathematics should play the role of the most fundamental discipline that Aristotle called *the first philosophy* and his disciples – *metaphysics*.

(Let me mention in advance, that the first philosophy according to Aristotle's explanation asks about "being *qua* being", and can be called also "theology", because the question about the most basic principles of "what-is" is inseparable from the

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inquiry about the Divine being. One has to look for the answer outside science in the true sense within the variety of nuanced ways for addressing the kind of 'ultimate question', to which philosophy and theology belong. At the and of this paper I shall try to show how the idea of a 'hermeneutical ontology' resonate with the patristic tradition of the Eastern Christianity.)

The hermeneutical approach must be exercised in order to comprehend two aspects of the contemporary *modus existendi* of mathematics within the corpus of science. The first one concerns the choice of mathematical formalism as the skeleton of the modern scientific conceptual systems ('conceptual schemes'). The second aspect of the hermeneutical approach is connected with internal structure of mathematics itself, and I shall discuss it in more detail later on.

There is a certain historical fact: the creators of 'modern science' had chosen a certain language that was sought as the 'proper' language of natural philosophy. Now we may recall that this choice was motivated precisely by the idea according to which the universe is a kind of project realized by the Divine Creator and which is developed in the language of mathematics. In one of his writings in 1623 Galileo stated:

> Philosophy (i.e. natural philosophy) is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands constantly open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it, without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth

It is quite clear from this text that Galileo supposes the existence of a 'literal sense' contained in natural phenomena and that he supposes there exists an 'original language' which records this sense. Therefore the *only* 'correct' language capable of describing the 'laws of the universe' must be selected by scientists themselves, which leads to the selection of the *only* 'correct' language being a scientific 'description' of facts. That is, if we want our description to be really and authentically 'scientific' we must follow these rules.

But the tradition of Biblical hermeneutics teaches us that the Holy Scripture remains in the permanent process of, let me say, 're-writing', which means that time and again it produces new essential meanings and values within the permanently changing human world, within the varied cultural and intellectual contexts. It teaches that the 'authentic sense' of the Holy Writ is an ambiguous concept – if by that expression we refer to a 'thing in itself', something akin to Wiggins' "horse, leaves, sun and stars" having an autonomous existence, independent of the traditions of interpretations. According to my tradition – to the attitude of the Orthodox Church – the 'strict sense' of the Scripture does not exist autonomously, without the tradition of exegesis.

It is quite clear that the modern scientific search for the *only* 'correct' language to express the sense (i.e. the 'literal sense') of meaning in an absolutely univocal way is nothing less than an attempt at avoiding the need for interpretation altogether. It is clear that this attempt was brought about by the inherent problems of the hermeneutical approach itself. This became clearly manifest already within the framework of Christian exegesis, for example in the dispute of theologians at Alexandria and Antiochus. Thus certain questions must unavoidably be raised: to what extent can this or that way of interpretation (exegesis) be verified? What meaning can we *not* suppose [incredible] to be

hidden behind the lines of Holy Writ? Is there a criterion for the universal relevance of our interpretation? Of course the church tradition possesses certain ways of verification dependent on the *consensus patrum* and preserved by the Church. Yet these criteria rely on certain theological premises which can hardly be unanimously accepted across the breadth and width of all Christendom. That is why we just point out this difficulty and the fact that hermeneutics as a science sets itself precisely the goal of defending the text from arbitrary ideas of this or that interpreter.

From the other side we would now like once more to draw attention to the impossibility of avoiding the hermeneutical dimension as such, that is, to its irreducibility. During the days when modern science was gaining converts in the language of mathematics, the way of understanding Holy Writ as dictated by church tradition often stopped satisfying people. And they said: 'No – we shall address the text itself!' This was what Luther had done. He rejected all interpreting texts and said: 'No, I shall read the Holy Writ itself, *sola Scriptura*!' At a certain moment of history such a step may have been extremely fruitful and served to immensely widen the scope of our individual vision. Yet was it still possible that anyone could actually *read the Holy Writ itself*? May not this or that theological tradition represent *the very mode of existence* of the meaning of Holy Writ? Any attempt to discard all 'other' interpretations does not necessarily lead to an understanding of the 'literal sense' of the text; it just marks a transition to another hermeneutical tradition, which itself has not even sprung up from scratch. For instance, Luther, relied on the Latin version of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (1:17) and interpreted this passage as he did, understanding in a certain way the words *justitia Dei* on the basis of his own purifying and 'indisputable' experience of being 'justified by faith'.

And Galileo also said: 'I shall discard the whole of Aristotle's physics, the whole of the tradition of describing the essence

of natural phenomena and shall read instead the book of nature itself'. Yet while he was relying for that reading on his own observations and experiences which he believed to be indisputable (since, like Luther's faith, they seemed to him based on immediately convincing facts), Galileo supposed to have *guessed* what the real language of nature was and in which way it speaks to penetrate observers. Of course, nature had not remained 'silent' before Galileo. Nature is always speaking with us and to us and in us. We are writing poems and novels about it, the Greeks were writing philosophical texts on nature in their time. But Galileo presumptuously said, 'No – *I* know the original language of nature which is the language of mathematics.' Yet in fact the choice of this language by Galileo was not without precedent either. He plainly relied on the above-mentioned notion that the universe was 'written' by the Creator [in the language of mathematics]; that he chose mathematics to express himself does not negate the theological underpinnings of his scientific approach. And just as in the case of theological exegesis, we can question the grounds on which this language was chosen, its limitations and the scope of its 'explanatory power'.

Though, as it has been said, we are not inclined to look for the only possible, 'authentic' language to speak about nature, it is the matter of fact that the mathematical language has become an indispensable constituent on the modern science. Let us accept this circumstance just as the matter of fact ant try to understand what important consequences should be drawn.

The choice of the language of a scientific theory, as said above, inevitably means the choice of the language of factual description. In the previous part of the paper I tried to justify my conviction that so-called 'facts' do not remain indifferent to the language in which they are described. I do not think that the notion of a 'pure' fact, completely unconnected with the sphere of language, human activity and human interests in general has

any sense at all. In exactly the same way, the 'literal meaning' of a text, without any interpretation, cannot be arrived at. The facts of science are loaded with theory and technology and a history of experiments. Natural sciences therefore do not escape the scope of hermeneutics any more than the humanities.

Thus Galileo undertook the obligation to read the universe and its phenomena in a certain language which he considered to be *the authentic language* of the divine design, and the contemporary science adheres to this project. It is exactly this idea that allows me to speak of mathematics as *the universal* formal ontology of the modernity. But this 'language' itself is by no means a constant value. To the contrary it is a subject of impetuous historical change and conceptual innovations. This means that, on the one hand, the natural phenomena, the subjects and the results of scientific observation, have acquired a privileged 'conceptual scheme' to be comprehended and, on the other hand, that the changes in the scientifically interpreted world depend first of all on the conceptual changes in mathematics.

Sir Peter Strawson, while insisting on the existence of "a massive central core of human thinking which has no history," states at the same time that the unchangeable concepts and categories "are not the specialties of the most refined thinking", just the contrary – "they are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking". But mathematics does belong to the scope of the most refined thinking and must to all appearances pertain to the "specialist periphery" of the vigorous conceptual change, and it is exactly this zone that determines the conceptual schemes to 'single out the things' of the world of sciences. If natural sciences in aggregate claim to be a universal ontology of nature, the *way of being* pertinentto the*beings* of this ontology depend on the conceptual innovation in mathematics itself. Let me formulate this in such a way: the *modus existendi* of the scientifically

interpreted world depends on the *modus exitendi* of the objects of mathematics.

The discussion of this latter way of being constitutes a massive part of the contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and the spectrum of different ontological positions here is rather wide. Hermeneutics, as it has been said, is both a new method and a new starting point in philosophy – a new 'first philosophy' according to early Heidegger. The hermeneutical approach that, in the form of the 'existential hermeneutics,' is constitutive for Heidegger's fundamental ontology has its counterpart in the philosophy of mathematics. A detailed elaboration of this subjects exceeds the limits of this work, but the main ideas pertaining to this approach are to be outlined.

The recent attempts to overcome the canonical schism between Platonism, Formalism and Constructivism and to understand mathematical entities within the framework of the empiricism of the good old days, to "modify the traditional account of [the objects of mathematics – sets, numbers, functions, etc.] as inaccessible Platonic things and instead bring them into our familiar space-time context," even to argue "that they are accessible to our ordinary perception", contradict obviously the hermeneutical ontology, which proclaims a mutual dependency between 'facts' and 'concepts'. Concepts, the mathematical concepts in particular, cannot be 'read out' of the 'facts,' cannot be a result of a 'mediate abstraction procedure', because, according to our explanation, they single out the 'facts' and "cut up the [scientifically apprehended] world into objects." On the other hand, it is impossible indeed, on the same ground, to ascribe to the mathematical entities a kind of eternal, a-historical,

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self-sufficient being, that is to adhere to Platonic ontological position. There is a hermeneutic alternative to Platonism in mathematics which is quite different from the neo-empiricism mentioned above. According to this philosophical position *mathematics itself is to be understood as a formal hermeneutic*. There is a set of *names* 'designating' from time immemorial the privileged subjects of mathematical thought, such as 'number', 'infinity', 'space', 'continuum' etc. What are the *nominata* for these *nomina*, and what is the way of there being? Of course they do no exist in space and time, as objects of sensual perception, and, as it has been mentioned, I do not think that in relation to them an 'empirical reduction' is possible. Let me repeat the ontological formula which has been phrased above: the *nominatum* of a 'mathematical *nomen*' is nothing else that the invariant of the historically varied contexts of the *nomen*-usage. These manifold contexts are bound together by the relations of (sometimes mutual) interpretations, that is, by 'hermeneutical relations'. The *being* of a *nominatum* is nothing else than the identity of its 'hermeneutical trajectory' within the history, within variegated, historically changeable conceptual schemes. A *nomen* shifts in its historical drift from a context to another context. Within a certain context it has more or less definite meaning, but this meaning can be drastically changed in the course of this conceptual and contextual journey. But a certain succession is preserved, a certain continuity of a 'hermeneutical trajectory' is sustained, which can be disclosed within an appropriate research in the history of ideas. Let us consider for example a concept of *topos* or *chora* in Greek mathematics, the notion of *space* in Newtonian mechanics (and its purely mathematical counterpart – *the* Euclidean space), and then the chain of the 'descendant' concepts, such as, for example, Riemann manifold, scheme (in the sense of the contemporary algebraic geometry), Grothendieck *topoi*, etc. The relation between the previous and subsequent

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concept, between the ancestor and the descendant is not that of 'generalization', it has much more complicated, though in each case clearly determined, character. In many cases, for example, such a relation can be grasped formally as a functor between two different categories (in the sense of Mac Lane's *category theory*). Even within a synchronic layer of mathematics there is a system of different formal approaches, different axiomatic systems etc. which form a set of perspectives to look at an indeterminate X, named e.g. 'space,' named even by a family of different names (Riemann manifold, scheme, Grothendieck topos. . .), but recognized nevertheless under these different names as the foundation of the identity of a hermeneutic trajectory. Platonic self-sufficient and self-identical being of an ideal object is to be replaced by the continuity of a hermeneutic trajectory in which different synchronic and diachronic contexts are discernable and interrelated. In its drift among these varied contexts a mathematical entity (perhaps, under different but clearly interrelated names) draws a connected trajectory. And this trajectory is never completed, always remains within an open historical horizon.

Patristic Heritage: The Logoi of Creation

In conclusion I would like to connect this sketch of a 'hermeneutical ontology' with some patristic themes. In Eastern Church fathers the idea of a permanent creation, which is more or less a common theological property of different Christian denominations, acquires its peculiar form in the doctrine on the *logoi* of creation. The most important writer for me in connection with the goals of this paper is St. Maximus the Confessor, a great Byzantium theologian of the 7^{th} century, but already before Maximus, Christian thought about the Logos and

the *logoi* of things had a rich history of its own. The Christology of the prologue to the Gospel of St. John was quickly developed further in the ancient Church, especially in the theological school of Alexandria, and not only in explicit relation to a current philosophical speculations of Stoic origin. It was also related to the Jewish theology of Philo of Alexandria. A number of ancient Christian writers made use of the Philonian understanding of Logos as the true centre of the intelligible world. This corresponds to a totality of ideas in the Platonic sense, but there is an essential difference. Philo as a Jew sees the Logos in terms of a personal Deity, and thus the coming together of all ideas in the Logos means their coming together in God. Here is the point where the Christian writers (such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Evagrius Ponticus) claimed that they have their own answer. The *logoi* for them are not only more or less static ideas of God lying behind creation (akin to Platonic paradigms, samples for the Demiurgic creation of cosmos). According to Evagrius the *logoi* of *providence and judgment* are to be taken into account. This means that logoi also have to be understood in a *dynamic* sense as "divine and good intentions" for the world. For Maximus, created nature would lose its very existence if it were deprived of its proper *energeia*, its proper purpose, and its proper dynamic identity. This proper movement of nature, however, can be fully itself only if it follows it proper goal (*skopos*), which consists in striving for God and a certain collaboration (*synergia*) with him in fulfilling the logos, or divine purpose, through which and for which it is created. The true purpose of creation is, therefore, communion in divine energy, transfiguration, and transparency to divine action in the world.

During the entire Byzantium Middle Ages, Basil's homilies *On the Hexaemeron,* were the most authoritative text on

the origin, structure and development of the world. Opposing the Hellenistic and Origenistic concept of creation as eternal cyclical repetition of worlds, and affirming creation in time, Basil maintains the reality of a crated movement and dynamism of nature. "Let the earth bring forth" (Gen 1:24): "this short commandment", says Basil, "immediately became a great reality and a creative logos, putting forth, in a way which transcends our understanding, the innumerable varieties of plans. . . Thus, the order of nature, having received its beginning from the first commandment, enters the period of following time, until it achieves the overall formation of the universe." Using the Stoic terminology of the *logoi spermatikoi* (seminal reasons) Basil remains theologically independent from his non-Biblical sources. For example he rejects the Stoic idea that the *logoi* of creatures are the true eternal essences of beings, a concept which could lead to the eternal return "of words after their destruction." Basil, as well as Maximus, remains faithful to the Biblical concept of absolute divine transcendence and freedom in the act of creation; divine providence which gave being to the world through the *logoi*, also maintains it in existence and fulfills its goal, but not at the expense of world's own created dynamism, which is a part of the creative plan itself.

In *Questiones ad Thalassium* (Q. II) Maximus clarifies the essential mechanism of the creative dynamics. He writes that, though *logoi* of creatures are fulfilled and perfect in God, not only their being is preserved in the process of permanent creation, but God constantly accomplishes the procession of their potential parts in actual being, rearranging them in a new order. Platonic ideas have no "parts," they are deprived of any potential constituents that might become actual, that's why they are completely a-historical, but not the *logoi* of creation.

Now, coming back to the main subject of my paper, I would like to stress that the way of being which the hermeneutical ontology, sketched above, ascribes to mathematical objects much more resembles this patristic philosophy (or theology) of creative *logoi* than Platonic or even Stoic ontology. In the hermeneutic ontology the main enigma that refers to the true *topos* of "reality," contrary to the alleged autonomous being of concept's extensions before the concepts formation, is the world's "resistance" to the conceptual innovations in the face of the common (though culturally diverse) human life-world, in the course of its history. This resistance has its counterpart, which is an unexpected break through in thinking, a strange fair wind in the sail of a research, an unexpected result of a calculation, an emergence of new facts which do not fit into the old theories and support the anticipation of a new one. A transcendental concept historically actualizes and rearranges its "potential parts," forming a hermeneutical trajectory.

In Church fathers this 'ultimate reality', which manifests itself as the resistance force opposing the arbitrariness of conceptual innovations, is called *God's will and providence in the permanent process of creation*. The hermeneutical analysis of science and, in particular mathematics, allows us to guess how the *logoi spermatikoi* work in the creation. But in itself this is only a step of interpretation, a particular hermeneutical approach, inscribing our research in its proper hermeneutical trajectory.

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Socrates as a Jungian Analyst

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In this paper, I will discuss some important comparisons between Jung's description of the activity of an analyst, especially the relationship between an analyst and a client, and Socrates' relationship to his interlocutors. Both the competent Jungian analyst and the competent dialectical teacher must have achieved a high level of self-conscious awareness before they can lead others in that direction. This paper will explain and defend four points. First, effective analysts and effective dialectical teachers must know themselves. On both Jung's and Socrates' view, self-knowledge is developed and preserved through an inner dialogue of the soul with itself, which is, in fact, a dialogue between consciousness and what would otherwise be unconscious. Second, because they know themselves, effective analysts and effective dialectical teachers also have insight into other people's characters and motives. Third, effective analysts and effective dialectical teachers act as midwives while those with whom they are speaking present ideas to be examined. Fourth, both effective analysts and effective dialectical teachers have the character-traits necessary to establish long-term meaningful relationships with other people from many walks of life. Such relationships, often labeled "Platonic," are, I submit, the cornerstone of a satisfying life for an individual and the cornerstone for civilized life in any society. An exploration of the relationships between a Jungian analyst and client and Socrates and his interlocutors, therefore, provides a model for the kind of personal and interpersonal life which every human being needs to cultivate in order to have a personally satisfying life and in order to contribute to the quality of life in the broader social and political order.

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First, Jungian analysts and dialectical teachers must know themselves. This requires an inner dialogue between consciousness and the unconscious. Jung defines the unconscious as,

> Everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything which, involuntarily, and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness. (*Collected Works* 8:185)

Most importantly, the unconscious contains "dark" instincts which are often repressed or denied as well as the most profound, creative, and positive instincts. All instincts, claims Jung, need to be recognized and allowed to play a role in conscious life. Although it might seem counter-intuitive at first, recognition of the unconscious will lead consciousness away from absorption in the individual self and toward a more universal and objective understanding of oneself and of the human condition.

According to Jung, someone who is dedicated to personal integrity and self-knowledge will renounce the perspective of the personal ego, which only recognizes what it can understand and control, and pay attention to all aspects of the psyche as they express themselves through "inner voices" contrary to the dominant voice of the ego,

> Thus, in coming to terms with the unconscious, not only is the standpoint of the ego justified, but the unconscious is granted the same authority. . . The way this can be done is best shown by those cases in which the 'other' voice is more or less distinctly heard. For such people it is technically very simple to note down the

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> 'other' voice in writing and to answer its statements from the standpoint of the ego. It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and considers it worthwhile to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of thorough comparison and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from one another. (*Jung on Active Imagination*, 58)

Many passages in Plato's dialogues express a similar view. Socrates is often referring to "voices" he hears, such as the voice of "The Laws" in the *Crito* dialogue. In two places Socrates explicitly refers to thought as such an inner dialogue. In the *Theatetus*, Socrates says,

> Now by 'thinking' do you mean the same as I do?. . . A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I'm only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment. (189e-190a)

Again, in the *Sophist*, Socrates says,

> Aren't thought and speech the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself? (263e)

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Socrates' ability to ask the right questions, his reputation as a great dialectician, was based on his experience of an inner dialogue within his own soul. Jung would claim that Plato's dialogues are reflections of the inner and outer dialogues which all thoughtful people have with themselves and others because such dialogues are parts of the collective unconscious, or parts of the human psyche which are both cultural and inherited.

Jung himself had experiences with figures in his imagination who spoke on behalf of the unconscious and functioned as tutors, or guides, in keeping him aware of repressed or denied aspects of his own psyche,

> Philemon and other figures of my fantasies brought home to me the crucial insight that there are things in the psyche which I do not produce, but which produce themselves and have their own life. Philemon represented a force which was not myself. In my fantasies I held conversations with him, and he said things which I had not consciously thought. For I observed clearly that it was he who spoke, not I. . . It was he who taught me psychic objectivity, the reality of the psyche. Through him the distinction was clarified between myself and the object of my thought. He confronted me in an objective manner, and I understood that there is something in me which can say things that I do not know and do not intend, things which may even be directed against me. Psychologically, Philemon represented superior insight. (*JAI*, 30)

Whenever Socrates is describing inner voices, the voice which speaks to him presents a view which contradicts either his own point of view or the point of view of the conscious ego. In each case, his dialogical confrontation with the inner voice gives him

a more objective view of the issue in question. Further, for the reader of Plato, Plato's dialogues as a whole represent the standpoint of superior insight. By studying and internalizing the dialogues within Plato's dialogues, the reader develops an inner dialogue with his or her own unconscious in both its positive and negative manifestations.

This heightened level of conscious awareness enables a person to communicate with others. Jung argues that the ability to understand and communicate with others depends on self-knowledge,

> The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are to let the other man's argument count, although this capacity is a fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community. Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit the validity of the other person, he denies the 'other' within himself the right to exist—and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a touchstone for outer objectivity. (*JAI*, 58)

The vast majority of people are quite incapable of putting themselves individually into the mind of another. This is indeed a singularly rare art, and, truth to tell, it does not take us very far. Even the man whom we think we know best and who assures us himself that we understand him through and through is at bottom a stranger to us. He is 'different'. The most we can do, and the best, is to have at least some inkling of his otherness, to respect it, and to guard against the outrageous stupidity of wishing to interpret it. (*JAI*, 67-68)

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In the *Charmides* dialogue, Socrates discusses the question, "What is temperance, or self-knowledge?" He explains how temperance affects an individual's ability to understand and communicate with others,

> Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know. (167a)

Socrates goes on in the *Charmides* to explain how individuals with self-knowledge can have a positive effect on society,

> . . . if, as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand—rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them—nor would we trust those over whom we rule to do anything except what they would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the science. And thus, by means of temperance, every household would be well-run, and every

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> city well-governed, and so in every case where temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably and well in all their doings and, faring well, they would be happy. (171d-172a)

Both Jung and Socrates, therefore, seek self-knowledge and try to encourage such knowledge in others, because it is a great blessing to individuals and to societies.

Further, both Jung and Socrates use the image of the midwife to describe what they do. Edward Whitmont, summarizing Jung, says,

> The therapist consequently finds himself in a new role which is quite at variance with the traditional image of the knowledgeable psychiatrist who diagnoses and treats a clinical case with sage counsel. He can no longer regard himself as a detached observer who recognizes what is right or normal and advises his patient accordingly. As one who is to aid in the birth of new meaning as unknown, and indeed unknowable, to him as it is to his patient, the therapist plays a role more nearly that of a midwife or of an experienced senior partner in a common undertaking, a common search. . . .The therapeutic relationship becomes an existential encounter, and indeed Jung felt that if any change is to occur at all it must touch and affect both participants. (*The Symbolic Quest*, 296)

In the *Theatetus* dialogue, Socrates also refers to his activity of teaching as a kind of midwifery,

> . . . the work of midwives is a highly important one. . . Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects. The difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth. For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress—a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God's help, who deliver to them this offspring. And a proof of this may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought that I was no good. . . they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more

> value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everybody else. . . Sometimes they come back, wanting my company again, and ready to move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make progress. . . at times. . . I come across people who do not seem to me somehow to be pregnant. Then I realize that they have no need of me, and with the best will in the world I undertake the business of match-making; and I think I am good enough—God willing—at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. (150b-151b)

In many ways, Socrates' model of teacher as midwife reflects an intellectual version of what Jung would call a spiritually mature soul. First, the intellectual midwife does not either repress or project any of the contents of his/her psyche onto a student. This is not because the person is God and never experiences conflict. Rather, it simply means that, when engaged with another person who is "pregnant" with an idea, the wise person forgets his/her own ideas and simply listens. A spiritually mature person can listen and get inside the soul of another person and follow the emotions, ideas and connections between them of that person.

The spiritually mature person, both teacher and analyst, knows how to listen more than anything else; s/he knows that someone who is under the influence of a confused idea needs to project it onto another person and have that person project it back or, to put it another way, everyone needs to examine their

ideas very carefully with someone s/he can trust. In examining one's ideas, one is examining oneself. The spiritually mature person does not judge the particular person who presents the idea, but examines the idea itself through the categories of the collective unconscious, the categories of truth, justice and beauty.

The intellectual midwife stays focused on the idea and does not focus on the person who has the idea. When one finds the idea inadequate this does reflect upon the person who has the idea, but the person who has the idea must make a choice between identifying with the idea and hence refusing to give up the subjective point of view and the ego associated with that point of view, or giving up the subjective, ego-driven view of the world in favor of an objective point of view, even if it makes the ego look ignorant or even deluded. By staying focused on the idea, not the person, a conversation with a spiritually mature person is the only way anyone can make the transition from the conscious, self-centered ego to the collective unconscious.

There are many problems with such a dynamic, however. First, the interlocutor might resent being deprived of his/her subjective point of view and will blame the teacher for the problem. In these cases, the teacher will be labeled as a bad person and/or a bad teacher. In other cases, the teacher is, indeed, bad because s/he will project his/her own perspective back onto the student and prevent the student from gaining self-knowledge. If the teacher and student always agree, the teacher will gain a reputation for being wise; but it will not be a justified reputation. If the educational process is based on agreement between teacher and student then no one learns and teachers simply create students who grow up to be just like their teachers but who never go through the painful process of self-examination. In such cases, a teacher creates a group of students who

think they know more than they know because they are disciples of a teacher who thinks he/she knows more than he/she knows. Gorgias, Protagoras and other sophists are teachers in this sense. In other cases, a teacher will criticize an idea when it is really partially correct. In such cases, a thoughtful student would be cut off from the study of philosophy because s/he was cut down too soon. This is another way a bad teacher projects his/her ideas and psyche onto a student. The problem, again, is a failure to listen and then to take an idea and stay focused on the idea, not on the person who presented the idea.

Sometimes the person who comes to a teacher or analyst is almost incoherent. S/he is in a state of intense inner conflict. It is difficult for a teacher to tell if the cause of this conflict is an inflated ego which finally realizes the limits of its own importance or the opposite problem: a person who is trying desperately to gain an objective frame of reference from which to understand human life and simply cannot find the language to express this deep need and desire. The teacher should be able to figure out the cause fairly easily. But the student who is struggling to gain insight is in a psychologically precarious position. The unconscious is coming into consciousness; it wants to be integrated into the conscious mind. This person's psyche is seeking wholeness, but it is a long a difficult process.

It is a rare person, whether teacher, analyst, or mentor, who can play the role of midwife whenever necessary and can play it well. Every society needs spiritually mature adults in any walk of life who act as spiritual and intellectual midwives: who seek the higher perspective and who take the time and effort to help those who also seek self-knowledge and insight.

Further, this kind of relationship, whether it occurs formally as a teacher- student, analyst-client, or mentor-mentee relationship, is also a good model for long-term, meaningful friendships. The difference is that a friend is someone who has

gone through the process and sees the world and human experience from an objective point of view. This explains why Socrates emphasizes in many Platonic dialogues how much he values friendship. In the *Lysis*, an entire dialogue on friendship, Socrates says,

> Ever since I was a boy there's a certain thing I've always wanted to possess. You know how it is, everybody is different: one person wants to own horses, another dogs, another wants money, and another fame. Well, I'm pretty lukewarm about those things, but when it comes to having friends I'm absolutely passionate, and I would rather have a good friend than the best quail or gamecock known to man. . . There's no doubt in my mind, by the Dog, that I would rather possess a friend than all Darius' gold, or ever than Darius himself. That's how much I value friends and companions. (211d-e)

If the philosopher/analyst is, indeed, a person who has an objective point of view, then it is reasonable to think that such a person would want friends and would be able to be the friend of other good people. Anyone who takes the objective point of view will feel alone and lonely without someone else with whom to converse. Such people won't complain if there is no one else around, but they will certainly try to find others with whom to converse, partially because they need to test their views against the views of others and partly because they need to keep expanding and applying their point of view to the situations around them. Such a person would direct conversations toward the truth. Friends engaged in such conversations would not mind being corrected if the correction truly came from the objective point of view. But the goal would be to develop a point of view which is deeper, more true, more just and more beautiful than

one can find in the daily activities of the subjective psyche. It is a mutual search for meaning with another person who is on the same search. Such relationships are based on the desire to know and the need for meaning; they are the cornerstone of a truly civilized life. They are what make human life worth living and what promote social well-being more than any particular body of laws or social institutions.

Without self-knowledge and meaningful friendships a society cannot function efficiently and cannot provide its citizens with an emotionally, spiritually and intellectually satisfying life. The models of the Jungian analyst and the Socratic teacher, therefore, are important archetypes toward which every human being who wants to live a meaningful life should strive to imitate. Further, Plato's dialogues are a unique form of literature which attempts to express the inner dialogue of the collective unconscious with consciousness as well as being general examples of the most meaningful conversations we have with others.

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The Ongoing American Experiment: Can We Live in Peaceful Co-resistance with Religious Rivals?

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I

As more and more people seem to think that speaking a critical remark about another's belief in public is hate speech, we are reminded how every generation of Americans has to discover for themselves whether or not they want to live peacefully with neighbors we think are going to hell or think we are. Our brand of democracy is a continual risky experiment to see if we citizens can sustain a thriving social order even as we disagree about the foundation for that order, the purpose for life, religion and morality. Although we almost lost it over the morality of slavery, astoundingly we have kept our union in tact while we continue to contest the divergent religious and philosophical ways that order our interrelated lives.

Each generation must learn from experience that America is designed as an ideological fight ring where the rules of fair play are taken as seriously as the topic of the fight. When enough of us begin to think the rules of fair play apply to some contestants but not others, the American union hangs in the balance. You must allow your opponent all the privileges that you have in the ring or the contest of truth is a sham—with no victory possible—only mutual resentment and self-contempt hidden in self-righteousness.

Each generation must also learn that openly advocating the superior rightness of our truth is not always a sign of arrogance. It can and often is an act of responsible citizenship as

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long as proclaiming includes respectful listening to opposing counter-beliefs. Each generation needs to learn the political equivalent of tough love that, kept this side of anger, unites us in healthy tension over our different views of salvation or enlightenment or ultimate truth. The moment of truth for each American occurs not during the pledge of allegiance, nor even when called to give your life to defend the country—these patriotic acts are common to all nations. It comes when the deep truth he or she holds most dear is openly called into question by another citizen who holds a contrary conviction just as passionately.

When eternal life and the right order of world is the subject of conflict, how do you treat your opponent? Americans have learned the hard way the best answer to that question. Namely, they try to persuade the heart and mind of their religious rivals to see the higher way. Without the pressure of legal sanctions for or against a particular religion, Americans learned to allow all voices (that did not disturb the civil peace) to openly challenge each other in a great on-going contest for the freely granted allegiance of the soul.

Americans have learned how to fight right over the truth because they know the end game is not imposing belief by force of law, but persuading allegiance by power of personal conviction. Americans have never and likely will never agree on the fundamental religious or ideological truth, so they have found a way to perpetually contest the truth within a legal framework that limits the use of coercion for all religions equally.

The reason Americans have come to live (with a few major exceptions) with the continual tension over religious differences that give conflicting answers to the question of foundational order of their society is this: Americans came to share a deep belief that God or Nature designed the world to allow the human conscience to manifest itself through free and un-coerced action.

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This unfettered freedom of the soul is the condition that creates the possibility of valuable love as we choose without being bribed or coerced to love and serve one person, nation, ideal or God *more* than another. This is why Americans often describe their deep convictions as *religious persuasions,* and why social theorists tend to reduce religious allegiance to an economic rational choice between competitive products. Actually the economic focus on value creation through scarcity has always been dangerously incomplete. Value creation—the focus of human interest on one thing above another—has a more from a more profound anthropology. It is the perennial desire to experience the superlative—in any field. In religion, the highest truth or purpose or God. This desire is enhanced by abundance of options as comparison of multi colored pictures is more interesting than merely measuring the relative size of black and white panels. So the deepest human value is experienced in the creative freedom to act for a purpose or worship a God that is higher than all the many others.

It is by engaging rivalries for the superlative we make life 'worth' living, and the superlative of superlatives is the idea (for some) or the reality (for many) of God. Most Americans have kept the vigor of religion in their lives—and in the culture—by engaging with persuasive fervor but without coercion in the contestation over the superlative God, over the highest purpose for life and the world. It is the active engagement in this contest that makes it a profound cultural force, not a theological or theoretical sport. Americans understand that respectful intolerance unites people in serious argument over the best while mere toleration is the sign of a society that does not enjoy itself. A flourishing civil life is based in care about your neighbor's beliefs and behaviors—not to apathetic or disdainful toleration that avoids contact with 'those idiots' or contamination by 'the impure'.

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The fundamental beliefs underlying the social political order of America are the incomparable worth of the freely offered allegiance of the human heart, coupled with the undeniable calling from God or Nature that each person hears. Once enlightened or saved, Americans have usually felt the responsibility to influence the hearts and minds of others to see and follow the highest light. Thus, we feel it normal to try to influence our immediate family and friends, then the broader community, and finally on the entire world.

Of course in matters of religion this leads to perpetual mutual contestation over ultimate truth. The American spirit has patience and is invigorated not exhausted with the healthy tension created by the contest over the Highest. Americans at their best engage religious rivalry as the social spiritual equivalent of tough love. At their worst, they have been bigoted bullies, willing to forcefully eliminate their rivals rather than try to convert by persuasion. The cohesive glue of American culture is found ultimately in the habit to think of our fellow citizens as reasonable and good-hearted opponents who are wrong yet open to our influence, not idiotic or evil enemies who are wrong and dangerously unsusceptible to our influence.

Americans seriously disagree about God and truth and openly try to persuade—not coerce—each other to see the light. This is what makes us a model for the world in the 21st century. While it might be useful to share our legal structure with other cultures, we cannot impose or export our long learned habits that stem from fundamental beliefs in the divine or natural way of healthy contestation of truth. We have missed the mark about this and it is time to be clear for our sakes if not the world's: It is not our form democracy or our form of modified capitalism that impresses the hearts of onlookers. It is our uncanny way of forthrightly opposing each other over what matters most—foundational order based in religious or tribal or

ideological tradition—with patience that successful persuasion demands when influencing free souls.

II

However, in recent years, whether from doubting anyone's sincere conviction or exhausted patience in the face of passionate shouting, Americans have been losing their habit of engaging in respectful contestation. We have lost track of the difference between angry hateful attacks and disciplined, sincere criticism. More insidious is the growing sentiment that in the name of cultural unity and preservation we are right to deride if not silence any public expression of particular religious or ideological beliefs. Passive tolerance rather than genuine engagement of differences has become the lazy way to cover resentment and contempt that festers and ultimately explodes in civil strife. Our country has never been so overwhelmed with diverse believers and cultural influences. The American experiment is now being tested again by cultural immigration and expansion of rival worldviews in our land—and through boarder crossing media in our cyberspace. To have a thriving society we cannot 'sit back' and merely contemptuously or untrustingly tolerate each other. To our union together as a strong and enjoyable society, we need a to regain the robust virtue or habit that might best be called of respectful intolerance.

Happily, history has provided us with an example of someone who embodied this virtue: Roger Williams (1603–1683), a firebrand preacher, linguist, diplomat, social critic, farmer, trader, husband, father, and charterer of the first government in history based on the liberty of conscience, and whom Martha Nussbaum recently called our First Founder—spiritual predecessor to James Madison and later founders. Williams abhorred

religious persecution in New and Old England but enjoyed a vigorous persuasive fight over religious truth. He unabashedly proclaimed his religion true, and just a frankly cared for his religious opponents' freedom of conscience to resist him. He listened respectfully and carefully to his adversaries trying to elicit a similar response from them. If we are wise, Williams will become the hero of millions of twenty-first century religious and secular persuaders in our country and worldwide. They will stand as ardent advocates of their beliefs *and* as adamant boosters of their adversaries' freedom to challenge them.

Williams believed that Christianity was true but said Christians had lost their way by trying to coerce belief through law: "The state should give free and absolute permission of conscience to all men in what is spiritual alone. Ye have lost yourselves! Your breath blows out the candle of liberty in this land." Religiously, he criticized the Puritans for not being pure enough! They forcefully expelled him from Massachusetts in 1635, but he eventually returned to England and deftly negotiated a unique charter for his new settlement, Providence (Rhode Island). It was established as a "lively experiment" in freedom of conscience where citizens could openly advocate and practice any religion or none with full protection of the law so as long as they respected the liberty of others. Providence was a religious and ideological "dojo" where contestation was expected and sustained within bounds proscribing coercion or violence.

In England, Williams had seen men imprisoned and tortured for their religious beliefs—beliefs Williams himself thought to be wrong. However, astoundingly for his time, he concluded both as a matter of faith and political order that all his opponents should be free by law to choose their way to hell. He could do no more than work to persuade them of the dangerous paths they were on and point toward the light that he hoped was to return. Punishing, silencing, ignoring, and exiling were out of

the question. Williams understood that we flourish when we engage—not when we persecute or disrespectfully tolerate. He debated his opponents adamantly all his life, in his seventies paddling his canoe alone for days in order to take on Quaker George Fox whose beliefs he could never simply tolerate.

Williams famously claimed that coercion in religion on a good day makes for hypocrisy, and on a bad day, rivers of blood. However, he understood that we can live together in respectful disagreement only if we feel free to advocate and defend our beliefs through sincere persuasion. Rhode Island quickly took in those others whom the Puritans rejected, including the first Jewish community in the Colonies, the controversial Quakers, and even agnostics. Instead of a saintly unified city on a hill, the civil order in Williams' Rhode Island looked more like a brawling boomtown but with all contestants wearing soft gloves—and the civil referee jumping in only to punish those who took them off.

The tumult of opinion that characterized early Providence was messy, to be sure. But even amidst the experiment's fractiousness, under Williams leadership openness to debate over the truth without coercion was the law. Believing that God never forces the soul, Williams graphically called coercion of conscience "soule rape." He thought the diverse world was designed to test the heart's true desire. Hence, any attempt to coerce or extort belief or practice by any means would contravene that crucial test and injure the conscience, creating resentment for the injury that might explode in violent retaliation. Further, he took delight in the freedom of others—even his adversaries'—because soul liberty is required for love itself (which is never coerced) to flourish.

In today's world in which technologies have emerged such that a very small group of zealous actors can wreak terrible havoc, we need to look hard at Williams's example precisely because he,

too, was a religious zealot—yet one who stood unflinchingly for his adversaries' unfettered freedom to oppose him by means of persuasion. His plan for lively contestation of religious factions was eventually employed by James Madison for the first freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. But it is Williams' virtuous attitude of respectful intolerance even more than his legal charter that makes him a timely example today: Where others saw demon enemies to eliminate, Williams saw free opponents to persuade.

No law can enforce this attitude of heartfelt respect or care for our opponents. It seems to derive from our face-to-face experiences of hearing each other advocate the truth in good faith. To feel *respect* pouring from a critical adversary is a bracing, life-changing experience that forces a strange and wonderful choice between taking offense or feeling edified. Williams's virtue—needed now in Boston, Beijing, and Baghdad—was to choose to take no personal offense when others told him his beliefs were wrong. Learning from Williams, this generation of Americans and world citizens can choose to proclaim truth to and listen to each other with the assumption (until proven otherwise) that our religious and ideological opponents are trustworthy people of wisdom and good will–not enemies. Respectful intolerance—choosing to engage our adversaries by patient, persuasive means—is the practical way to sustain flourishing social life on this pluralistic planet. Our best hope is to strive together in peaceful tension, the only peace congenial with freedom that allows for the test of truth and love.

III

So what would Williams do about the current conflict over building a religious and public dialogue center sponsored by

Muslims in downtown Manhattan? If he were living there, he would probably welcome it because it would allow him another venue (the dialogue center) where, after listening carefully to his opponents, he could try to persuasively preach his form of religion to anyone who didn't get it right (and that was *everyone* but him!) Williams would likely have not been as concerned about the building because he would not have seen the nearby crime scene as a religious beach head for Islam, but as place where, one more time, in the name of a higher good, humans are willing to shed the blood of their fellows. He would have remembered all the blood shed in the name of Christ in his time, and shaken his head at the impotence of force used to change the hearts of men. He in short would have made the positive equal religious freedom of expression and practice more important than trying to avoid offending the feelings of his fellow citizens. He would have carried a sign in front of the Mosque: "I will die for the freedom of these Muslim citizens to build their church here, and I will work my whole life to engage and persuade them that Christianity is the only true path to salvation."

Of course, humans have respectful memories of prior events and grant special memorial value to certain places that they call hallowed ground. Families or nations place memorials where accidents or murders have taken the life of loved ones or heroes. Now we must acknowledge that the gaping whole at the site of the former twin towers in lower Manhattan has not been officially consecrated as hallowed ground. (The attack on September 11, 2001 also hit the Pentagon and a field in rural Pennsylvania but perhaps because of the number killed the most significant site has become a block in lower New York.) It has not been turned into an obvious national cemetery for the fallen soldiers (the police and firemen in this case) like Pearl Harbor. The problem is that America has not agreed upon the final label for the attack, and cannot therefore agree on the correct way to

hallow the land and the proximate environment. Terrorism by individuals is not war. It is crime. Timothy McVey killed 168 civilians and was considered a criminal although he saw himself as a true American angry at the oppression of his government. Do we hallow the ground of the crime scene, the Murray Building in Oklahoma City? Mohammed Atta and his team religious sacrifice and ritual killing for their high purpose was not murder. They were advanced warriors, not criminals. Does it matter to you what your enemy is trying to kill you? When memorializing the event for history, it all matters. We need to sort out what the September 11th attacks were before we come to terms with the ethical question of building a Muslim house of worship near the site. (All parties agree that there should be no legal sanction against this building in this location.)

As Bruce Lincoln has insightfully observed after reading their writings, those who attacked the symbol of our economic power on September 11 were not trying to replicate Pearl Harbor, but Hiroshima. They were not starting a war, but ending one with a show of overwhelming power of a religion whose adherents believed that humans were meant to live and die to bring Islam into its rightful place in the world. They could show that economic or technological or military powers can be easily turned on themselves by those who choose to die (and yes, kill) for the higher cause of establishing divine righteousness. This is not unlike some very old Biblical thinking: Better to flood the entire perverted Earth (taking out some innocents in the process) and start over than to pass on to future generations the utter corruption of the righteous way that will take everyone to hell. Better to commit suicide by bringing down the palace killing everyone (even the innocent servants and children) than to allow the ruling powers to contaminate future generations with arrogant rejection of God's ways.

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Although they wrongly said Americans had lost courage for shedding their own blood in war, the jihadists' were not concerned with a counter attack because it would not matter in the long run. Running around hiding from cave to cave was not their first choice of outcomes, no doubt, but it was only a temporary inconvenience in the grand play that they thought was already in its last act. Regardless of their fate, orthodox Islam (or their brand of it) was the only power left with enough moral authority to bring order to a world that cared little for anything more than the carnal pleasures brought by wealth and power. Americans and others would fight back with their 'feeble means'—military and economic—but these would prove impotent in the face of the symbolic divine A-bomb of righteous power that would move the hearts of true Muslims to care more for eternal salvation than anything else.

After viewing the faces of Christians he had executed by the lions, Nero supposedly screamed in anger, "They're smiling!" The attackers (while murdering thousands of civilians) saw themselves not unlike the smiling Christian martyrs; and thought America and the modern regimes like it represented decadent ancient Rome—on the brink of its demise without knowing it. So, from a jihadist's viewpoint no matter how violently we counter-attack, dead or alive they keep smiling because God will have his way with the world, sooner or later.

Americans like to think of themselves as the nimble underdog with grit and ingenuity, truth and goodness on our side. We do not feel morally comfortable as a superpower that can easily bully others into submission. We know in our guts that the enemy attacked, not because of our support of human rights and political freedom, but because of what was seen as the morally decadent use of that freedom exported throughout the world. We know in our guts that the jihadists were not uneducated

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poor folks out for our money and territory, and thus, this was not a war we could easily win ending with a treaty.

American leaders quickly claimed that the war with the jihadists was about human freedom—saying 'they hate our freedom.' Unfortunately this is wrong and misses the point that most humans are not inspired merely by freedom. They are moved by the uncoerced choices for or against some cause or person that freedom allows. So the contemporary American battle cry, Freedom!, sounds morally hollow when it is a cry of freedom for materialistic nihilism that leads to enslavement to pleasure and power. Freedom, the best of political values, only feels good to citizens when they do not take it as license to do whatever they can get away with—morally or literally. Freedom in recent decades has an international image of decadence, not social progress that comes with productive discipline.

It was a mass murder of thousands meant to announce end of our decadent, arrogant, hypocritical reign under our banner of amoral freedom. Although their crime was odious, was their indictment of our society in some ways accurate? Do many of us have a feeling that we deserve to be chastened? When in war Americans killed hundreds of thousands of civilians with blanket bombing in Germany and A-bombs in Japan, we thought it was for a greater good. However, it taught us moral ambivalence, and though we called the jihadists' attack outright evil without any justification, for many who think our culture has gone awry there was a quiet unspoken understanding of the impatient activist on the left or the right that has simply had enough of the status quo to consider an immoral shakeup plan. So, it was an act of war without material motive and soldierly contact. The only way to win such a conflict is to kill or convert all of the enemy which is not likely to happen, but there is no

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clear end to celebrate—and no place or time to fix any final hallowing monument. We memorialize at the end of things, and when will this be finished?

So, what is the reason this Muslim building means so much to people beyond those who consider the area a cemetery for the dead family members? It means so much because we know it was intended by our adversary to mean so much. The dead victims, the collapses buildings and the economic and systemic disruption of our world—all were collateral damage! Then what was the target? Your consciousness of a group of people who think their God has been ignored and disobeyed for too long. That consciousness is the beginning of influence from a foreign culture that you now must reckon with. Consider it social networking in a terrorist mode. Everybody is recognizing the rise of a religious people who could—with petrol power and idealistic grit—really mess up our tidy little lives. You now have heard of Allah, and have thought 'what would it be like to believe in my religion or philosophy enough to kill people and myself by flying a plane into the World Trade Center?' Regardless of your answer, they have accomplished their primary mission as witnesses of a reality that considers death a mere change of scenery.

IV

So called, ground zero is not another Pearl Harbor, nor is it an American Hiroshima. The former was intended to humble our empire by means of traditional war, and the latter was a place marking the despair for the end of an empire and the guilt of both sides for waging war aggressively. For some final help with this question let us go to the two most hallowed sites of violence in America: first Gettysburg, Pennsylvania where

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more soldiers fought and died than any other battle in our history. About 50,000 troops lost their lives in three days. The body count alone of the brave who charged into each other's gun sights made this monumental, but it was the recognition of the valor and integrity of brothers in arms on opposite sides that hallows the fields of Gettysburg. Let us hear Abraham Lincoln on the subject of hallowing this ground:

> We are met on a great battle-field of . . . war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
>
> But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here.

Lincoln's statement does not use polarizing terms like 'our heroes' and 'their butchers.' He chose his words to include the brave men on both sides of the country's conflict with an eye toward binding the nation's wounds and bringing eventual reconciliation between citizens. Without focusing on the erroneous beliefs of his adversaries, or rubbing in the victory of one side of the conflict, the president honored the courage, valor, loyalty and final commitment of all soldiers to their cause.

The Twin Tower site will find a way into hallowedness when we come to consensus about the messy explanation of what happened and why. Of course all agree that the fire and police teams

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deserve special honors for their staunch valor, but a civilian victim of crime does not usually elicit hallowed status. It is yet unthinkable that some day we might hallow the site by including the 'brave . . . who gave their last full measure of devotion' on both sides. Today both sides see each other as criminals, but some day they may meet—jihadist who was saying his misguided prayer as he killed and died for a higher good, and the fireman who was saying his prayer as he died trying to save others for a greater good. This way of feeling would hallow the site like Gettysburg in an aura of mutual forgiveness. It is many years off if at all.

The other hallowed shrine is in Concord Massachusetts—where amateurs took on the big league players and started something very big indeed. Robert Frost said that whereas he was not much of a shriner, there were two places that he always felt to be hallowed ground when he visited there: the tall shaft to Washington on the great mall, and the minute man at the bridge over the stream in Concord. Emerson's poem describes the latter in hallowed terms:

By the rude bridge that arched the flood, Their flag to April's breeze unfurled, Here once the embattled farmers stood, And fired the shot heard round the world. The foe long since in silence slept; Alike the conqueror silent sleeps; And Time the ruined bridge has swept Down the dark stream which seaward creeps. On this green bank, by this soft stream, We set to-day a votive stone; That memory may their deed redeem, When, like our sires, our sons are gone. Spirit, that made those heroes dare, To die, and leave their children free, Bid Time and Nature gently spare The shaft we raise to them and thee.

What hallows our ground is the spirit that makes heroes dare to die for the well-being of future men and women. This is what we revere and memorialize over the centuries and beyond. Emerson like Lincoln saw that over the centuries winners and

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losers of battles blend together but the heroic sacrifice remains affirmed if one's motives in valor were to make a better future for others. So as Lincoln concluded: "It is for us the living . . . to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion— . . . that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom . . . and not perish from the Earth."

We may be in our waning years as an empire, but America need not perish as a powerful force for improving the lives of men and women everywhere. After a couple of hundred years it is a good time for a new birth of freedom in our country and the world—a new American freedom that enjoys the freedom of our trusted opponents to heartily resist or embrace our influence and vice versa. We are free to the extent we live in a trustworthy world. The new birth of freedom will grow as we can come see most of our opponents as men and women who like us dare to die for the future benefit of all—and who like us will rely on patient persuasion not disdainful coercion to accomplish the good they desire.

I cannot say what motivates the builders of the Mosque and cultural center for dialogue, but I presume it is a mixture of laudable things. If they go forward, let them make the place so obviously hospitable that all will soon be persuaded that their sincere desire to improve the world was more important than their resistance to acknowledge any association with the events of Sept. 11. If they are acting in bad taste, let us assume that they have done so in good faith, and embrace them as Roger Williams would—as fellow wrestlers—in the great American dojo where we struggle over the tensions our disparate religious loyalties create between religions and with our civic responsibility.

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The people who now live around ground zero will either hallow or sally the memory of the attack. The attackers meant to fire a new shot heard round the world, but they misfired. Now, America can carefully do something outrageously good—taking a new shot that will have the lasting power to be heard round the world–making every good hearted soul rejoice and the others scratch their bewildered heads. The people of NYC have a heroic chance here. Will they take it? What will they come up with?

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Meditation and Contemplation in Islamic Mysticism in Comparison to Buddhism

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Introduction

It is often assumed that in addition to validity of logic of the argument in question, ethics of decisions concerning our relations to others are based on inner beliefs of the agents. Consequently, in the studies of decision ethics on the global perspective, the question of existence of universal similarities of logic of contents of beliefs between major cultures is of significant import. To this end, this paper compares the most intimate intentional human experiences – namely "meditation" and "contemplation" – with practices in two of the most important religious traditions, namely Islamic mysticism (Sufism) and Buddhism. After a detailed comparison of these traditions, this paper reflects on salient issues on the value of religious studies for other disciplines.

Sufism understood as "Islamic Mysticism" is one of the most complex and significant Muslim traditions. It embraces religious codes and practices, philosophical, cultural, ritual, literary and spiritual traditions of more than one 1.3 billion Muslims since the 7th Century AD. The same phenomenon appears in different Buddhist traditions, beginning with the life of the historical figure Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha, 566-486 BC) and spread from India to all Asia (more widely spread in the past than today), now numbering about 400 million believers or about 5.8% of the world's population.

For the purpose of this paper, some similarities and differences between these two traditions with respect to the essential role of meditation have to be examined.

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In the case of Buddhist traditions, a common feature all schools share is the primary practice of 'mindful breathing' and 'sitting meditation'. The purpose of this practice is concentration of the mind on a chosen object or theme. In this tenor the mind is transformed into a tool to be used by what the Western tradition would call free will. As the goal is overcoming the "selfish" part of the self that is the foundation of all suffering, the goal of the practice is similar to an obedient servant following a master. Buddhism proffers that cleansing one's heart is achieved by praxis of ceasing negative intentions and performing right acts. Thus, meditation is not a goal in itself, it is a practice based on the assumption that all things are composite and transient, and that the goal of meditation is to overcome the impure view of reality in everyday life. Although there is a wide spread of forms of Buddhism, and although not even the core of the Theravada tradition is accepted as the core of doctrines shared by all Buddhists, the view of the self as a non-self, the supreme ideal of a dissolving ego, as a goal of contemplation and meditation, binds all lineages. A reference to a personal God is not part of the shared heritage.

Here, it is important to note that the concentration of Buddhist practices is a personal focus. In the case of Islamic Mysticism, the Sufi (Mystic) should meditate and concentrate his mind upon the thought of God. This mode is labeled as "*Moraqaba*" which means that the Mystic should watch over God, not God watches over him all time. In this light, The Holy Qur'an calls for full concentration and surrender to the will of the Beloved.

Meditation in God; and no evil thoughts or diabolic suggestion will find their way into the heart of the Mystic.

Salient Features

Here are various steps of the arguments embedded in this research:

1. The first focus of this study is to examine the relation between contemplation and meditation first in Islamic mysticism and then in Buddhism.

2. Next, this study attends to a special mode of contemplation, namely that of transcendence in Buddhism and Hindu philosophies, and that of Islam.

3. Then, the specific case of the relation between contemplation and the vision of God is examined. The vision of "naked Godhead" (or Holy Spirit in Christology, the other hypostases (persons) of the Christian tradition) both in Islamic mysticism and Buddhism in the state of enlightenment will then be studied.

4. Subsequently certain key notions such as "concentration," " meditation," "contemplation," "ecstasy," "annihilation," "illumination," passing away, and "mentioning" (archetypal recall) or "recollection" will be studied. These processes assist the mystic to attain moral transformation of the soul from passions and desires to a peaceful perspective. For example, the Sufis claim that a mental abstraction or passing away of the mind from all objects of perception, thoughts,

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action and feeling takes place through a concentration upon the thought of God.

5. Finally similarities between Islamic mystical meditation and Buddhism are explored. I examine the claim that contemplation is caused by concentration and meditation.

Meditation and Contemplation in the Holy Qur'an

Meditation in the Holy Qur'an implies an awareness of the universe and its laws; God Says. Behold in the creation of the heavens and the earth; in the alternation of the night and the day; in the sailing of the ships through the ocean for the profit of mankind . . . . Here indeed are signs for people that are wise.[1]

Contemplation means an ability to encounter a Divine Visions by the eyes of the heart or the "insight." In Muslim tradition, God says "that, have come to you from your God proofs to open your eyes if any one will see, it will be for the Good of his own soul."[2] In this light meditation is not a pure public experience but radiates through the entire inner, intentional experience of a human being.

Meditation is the best way of mentioning/reception (of) God; in this mode the believer's heart feels deep respect, fear, and trust of the Divine "for Believers are those who when God is mentioned feel a terror in their hearts; and when they hear his signs rehearsed find their faith strengthened and on their God they depend – trust on Him."[3]

Mentioning God or continual remembrance of Him gives satisfaction to the believers heart for ". . . those who believe and

[1] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Bqrah, 164.
[2] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Anaam, 104.
[3] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Anfal,2.

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whose hearts find satisfaction in remembrance of God; for without doubt in remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction."[4]

Meditation means to prehend the meaning of the Holy Qur'an, and its symbolic significances as the Divine source of the as words of God. The goal of meditation is to achieve an intentional feeling of no otherness. Thus, the Holy Qur'an questions: "do they not consider the Qur'an with care? Had it been from other than God they would surely have found therein much discrepancy."[5]

The Holy Qur'an questions accordingly if they do "not ponder over the word of God or has anything (new) come to them that did not come to their fathers of old?"[6]

Here one can conclude that meditation represents a state of abstraction or passing away of the mind from all objects of perception, thoughts and feeling through its concentration upon the thought of God, Nicholson assures that meditation here leads to contemplation he says "Here the thought of God signifies contemplation of the Divine attributes."[7] The study of meditation and contemplation will shed some light on the relationship.

Meditation on God (*Moraqabat* and Contemplation)

Meditation on God in Islamic Mysticism is one of the most important steps in the way/path/Dao to Allah.

God, as stated in the Holy Qur'an, cannot be seen by the physical eye, and received only to the inward insight; a salient

[4] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Raad, 28.
[5] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Nesaa, 82.
[6] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Moinun, 68.
[7] R.A. Nicholson; *The Mystics of Islam*; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London & Boston; 1963, p. 60.

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aim of meditation is to make the heart capable of the "vision" of God.

R.A. Nicholson says that "Meditation in God and no evil thoughts or diabolic suggestions will find their way into the heart."[8]

Meditation means concentration with full attention to God: quotationThe light of intuitive certainty *'yaqin'* by which the heart sees God is a beam of God's own light cast therein by himself; else no vision of him were possible.[9]

Meditation is embedded as an aspect of a superficially Sufi perception of the world. Accordingly, R.A. Nicholson recalls some very interesting tales on the art of learning how to meditate:

"Nuri used to meditate so intently that not a hair on his body stirred; he declared that he had learned this habit from a cat which was observing a mouse hole and that she was far quieter than the mouse. Abu Said Ibn abi L-Khayr kept his eyes fixed on his navel."[10]

In this tenor, a Sufi receives the secret ethos of meditation in all facets of creation. It is a concentration on one icon taken to be the nexus of the universe. As the Universe is a connected unity (*tawhid*), any events in the world could embed the secrete of the cosmos.

According to F.C. Happold, "It [meditation] is a state of self forgetting attention, . . . a still and steady gazing; an intense concentration so that emotion will and thought are all fused and then lost in something of deeper and deeper process of self merging; a communication is established between the seer and what is seer between him who feels and that which he feels."[11]

[8] Ibid., p. 50.
[9] Ibid., p. 50.
[10] Ibid., p. 49.

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Buddhist Meditation is the Royal way to a human's understanding of himself.[12] States, Evans Wentz in the words of Buddhist Scripture, "Cease to do evil; learn to do good, cleanse your own heart."[13] A person is achieving enlightenment via meditation, for the sake of a salvation that transcends the supreme ideal of a personal ego which is embedded in the Greco/Jewish or Christian or Islamic traditions. In this sense, Buddhist meditation has a fundamentally different goal. However, the practice of meditation is so central to both traditions that a comparison of mystical practices can be fruitful.

Subsequently this essay will argue that the experience of meditation is prevailing in most spiritual experiences, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, as well as in perennial philosophies. Often this state is described by a mystical awakening of the self enlightenment. It is an extra-ordinary state not known to all but limited to those illuminated mystics.

Meditation means *Moraqabat*; according to Qushari (d.1064), the notion of *Moraqaba* signifies that the Sufi Mystic knows that God is eternally watching over him/her; therefore he/she devotes him/herself to meditating on God all times; as it is the source of all good to the seeker who cannot reach this grade unless he judges himself from many perspectives, such as previous actions. The seeker needs to correct him/herself and follow "the right path" (*sarat al-mustaqim*). As the intentions and actions of the seeker are known by God,[14] then he/she is meditating and is near to the Divine.

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[11] C.F. Happold. *Mysticism*. Penguin books, London, 1990, p. 70.
[12] Christams Humphry; *Exploring Buddhism*. London; 1974, p. 176.
[13] Ibid., p. 176.
[14] Qushiary; Abu Al Qasim; *Al-Risala*. A. al Halby, 1959, p. 95.; 'Meditation' equals 'Samdhi', 'Absorption' equals 'Annihilation' "Fana". – *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol 4, p. 702.

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In this way Meditation seems to be of two different ways; one way from the seeker to God; the other way is from God to the seeker. In this light, if the seeker is aware that God watches over him/her at all time, then he/she too should also engage in self-reflection, and thus attempts to continue witness God's presence in his experience (it has to be added that off course the concept of a divine entity in some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism is fundamentally different from the view of a personal God. Neither Buddhism nor Hinduism are religions of the book.)

According to Griri, whoever does not reflect-judge the righteous Divine Code and *muraqabat* cannot attain illumination or contemplation. The path of meditation is saved with worshiping God exclusively for Gods' sake. In this mode the seeker's heart, dismisses all cars except the embodiment of thought of the Divine.

In meditation "*muraqabat*" we recognize a form of self concentration similar to the Buddhist notions of "*dayana*" and "*samdhi*."[15]

To deal with such an experience of mystical awakening means to deal with states of consciousness and types of very rare experience. Some of us have had an experience which we might describe as an intellectual illumination quits impossible to describe.

We may receive some kind of "Revelation" or a vision of sustaining love in heart in the very texture of the universe; but the dark silence, the loss of the path, nakedness and not-thing-ness; if they strike any answering chords at all; strike only faint and elusive ones; they are descriptions of states which are outside normal, experience.[16]

[15] R.A. Nicholson. *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 48.
[16] F.C. Happold, Mysticism; *A Study and a Anthology*, Penguin Books, England, 1990, p. 68.

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The state of illumination received in this feeling of unity is non-describable by ordinary language; mystics have attempted to explain it by icons in the way of nature mysticism.

"In the study of contemplation we, are considering a movement of consciousness towards a higher level as the result of the emergence and cultivation of powers which in most men and women remain latent. As found in the true contemplative state it is an extreme form of the withdrawal of attention from the sensible world and a total dedication of action and mind toward a particular mind" said Happold.[17]

Some think that "contemplation is thus a development form of that inward turning towards the deep center of the soul; for it is only here that God is to be found."[18]

It is a well known fact that contemplation is a tool of knowledge of God while Meditation is a medium of peaceful communication with reality. The Aristotelian notion of contemplation is thus not a meditative practice.

There should be some basis of classification for some rule by which to distinguish true contemplation from other introversive states. In this tenor, Evelyn Underhill mentions two marks of the real conditions: the totality and "givenness" of the object, and "Self Mergence (integration)" of the subject. Here are types of inquiries which clarify the character of the mystic: First, however described, to the mystic this experience of contemplation is absolute. It is revealed not via personal meditation or vision some partial symbol or aspect of another experience. This revealed reality is apprehended by way of participation not by way of observation.

In addition, there is an accompanying experience of a "passive receptivity of silence and peace. It is related to an outgoing

[17] Ibid., p. 59.
[18] Ibid., p. 69.

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self donation which is the self's initiative-response to the Divine. By a free act; independent of creature's effort, the Divine is disclosed in the soul of the mystic."[19]

It seems that "mediation" is just a passive concentration on God, on the One's existential essence; this experience is accompanied by the light of intuitive certainty *"yaqin."*

It is an experience of a still and steady gazing and an intense concentration on God.

While contemplation is an active outgoing self donation; it is accompanied with soul rushes out willingly to lose itself in God. "We must", says Dionysius the Areopagite (fl. 1st cent. AD, Athenian Christian) "be transported wholly out of ourselves and given unto God."[20]

The word "contemplation" may be used in two senses; First, the technical sense as a term to describe a state of mystical consciousness. Second, it is an instrumental sense of knowing, such as a tool of knowledge. It seems that meditation leads to contemplation in Islamic mysticism, and no contemplation can occur without a meditation.[21] One may consider contemplation as a transcendental meditation, going beyond the inner self. It is the experience of all; and this experience to the mystic is to be given rather than attained; it is indeed the Absolute which is revealed to him. Contemplation according to Muslim mystics is accompanied with a supreme insight, a vision of "the One" reality.

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[19] Evelyn Underhill; *A Study in the Nature and the Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness*; Methuen and Company; London, 1949, p.332, 333. 'Moraqaba' means "A Concentration on God"; it is just meditation, while "Contemplation," is an external active outgoing to God.

[20] Ibid., p. 333

[21] Ibid., p. 333.

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Ruysbroeck, who continued in the medieval world in the best traditions of Neoplatonic mysticism, also describes a condition of supreme insight, a vision of truth which is closely related to ecstasy; "contemplation," he states, "places us in a purity and radiance which is for above our ordinary understanding; more over none can attain this mode of by knowledge by subtlety or by any exercise but whom God chooses to unite to himself and to illuminate by himself."[22]

Meditation which is a necessary step to contemplation has so many features:

a. It is a continual concentration on god thought, as I mentioned before.

b. In meditation the mystic knows that God watches over him/her as he watches over God.

c. In meditation the mediator should watch his/her heart not the public because God watches his inward sight.[23]

The Contemplation of Transcendence

The nature of such experience of contemplation of transcendence is so difficult since we are dealing with rare states of consciousness. The idea of Divine Transcendental Reality is born in the heart of the mystic from his sense of his own weakness; littleness; and worthiness and ignorance in comparison with the greatness of the absolute God head.

[22] Ibid., pp. 333, 334.
[23] *Resalt* Al-Qushiary; p. 95.

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In such experience there is a new vision of the absolute; and a new vision of the world, asserts Happold; this vision is co-present, set side by side with an existential perception of presence and a feeling of a joyous apprehension of the absolute (*Hud*); there is found a new vision of the phenomenal world "which lights it up and makes it appear quite different as if there had been an abnormal sharpening of senses."[24]

The apprehension of the absolute reality is connected to the state of the heart when the heart is purged of sin and evil thoughts. The light of certainty strikes upon it and makes its shining mirror that reflects the image of God according to the state of the mystics' heart. Nicholson claims that "some Gnostic say of *I disobey my heart* equals *I disobey God*. It was a man thus illuminated whom the prophet said. Consult they heart and thou wilt hear the secret ordinance of God proclaimed by the hearts inward knowledge which is real faith and divinity."[25]

Nicholson adds that there are two kinds of contemplation,[26] the former is the result of perfect faith; the later of rapturous love for in the rapture of love a man attains to such a degree that this whole being is absorbed in the thought of the beloved and the sees nothing else.

Those who love God cannot see and anything without seeing God there in i.e. Sibily said[27]

> I never saw anything except God; i.e. in the rapture of love and the favor of contemplation one mystic sees the act with bodily eyes and as he looks, beholds the agent with spiritual eye; another is rapt by love of the

[24] F. C. Happold, *Mysticism*; p. 85.
[25] R.A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*; p. 53.
[26] Ibid., p. 55.
[27] Ibid., p. 56.

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> agent from all things else so that he sees only the agent. In sum, when the lover turns his/her eye away from created things he/she will inevitably see the creator with his heart, while those who know things and transported by desires cannot see Good as they are veiled by physical passions and desires.

The Holy Qur'an states appeals to "Recite;" the believers are to close their eyes to lessen their distractions, i.e. to close their bodily eyes to lusts, and turn their spiritual eyes to created things. For Muslims, he who is the most sincere in self mortification is most firmly grounded in contemplation. Abdallah of Tustar stated "if anyone shut his eyes to God for a single moment he will never be rightly Guided all his lifelong."[28]

God who is described in the Holly Qur'an as the light of the heaven and earth cannot be seen by the bad eyes; he is visible only to the inward sight of the heart. The vision of the heart is defined as the heart's beholding by the light certainty that which is hidden in the unseen world, says Nicholson;[29] this is what Ali meant when he was asked "so you see God and replied; How should we worship one whom we do not see? The light of intuitive certainty 'yaqin' by which the heart sees God is a beam of God's own light cast therein by Himself- no physical vision of him were possible."[30]

It is the vision of transcendental light; it is the light of heaven and earth; the supreme light; the unique light which is describe in the Holy Qur'an "God is the light of the heavens and earth; the parable of his light is as if there were a Niche and within it

[28] Ibid., p. 56.
[29] Abu Naser, *Al-Lumaa*; Revised by Abd Al Halim Mahmud, p. 35.
[30] Ibid., p. 50.

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a lamp; the lamp enclosed in glass, the glass as it were a brilliant star, lit from a blessed tree; an olive neither of the east, nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous though fire scare touched it; light upon light God doth Guide whom he will to his light."[31]

Those who contemplate God realize that the light of God is over the ability of mind and even the capacity of the heart. It is Glorious Illimitable Light, which cannot be described or measured; and there are grades and grades of it, passing transcendently into regions of spiritual height, which man's imagination can scarcely conceive of it.

The pinnacle, the true prototypal light, the real light of which all others were reflections, the light of God is the goal; hence the saying of the prophet about God seventy thousand veils of light.

Nicholson says "The light of Allah is compared to a candle burning in a lantern of transparent Glass; which is placed in a niche in the wall; the niche is the true believer's heart; therefore his speech is light; his works are light; and he moves in light."[32] Thus the vision of the seer is light; it is the vision of the supreme light that is the whole in whole.

At this point, the author wishes to include R. Nicholson's translation (cf. *The Mystics of Islam*), of a passage of a Persian ode by the dervish poet Baba Kuhi of Shiraz (d. A.D.)[33]

In the market in the cloister only God I saw
In the valley and on mountain only God I saw .
Him I have seen beside me oft in tribulation;
In favor and in fortune – only God I saw.

[31] Holy Qur'an; Sura Al-Nur, 35.
[32] Ibid., p. 51.
[33] Ibid., p. 59.

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In prayer and fasting; in praise and contemplation;
In the religion of the prophet only God I saw.
  Neither soul nor body; accident nor substance,
Qualities nor causes, only God I saw.
I opened mine eyes and by the light of his face around me
  In all the eye discovered. Only God I saw.
  Like a candle I was melting in his fire.
  Amidst the flames out flashing. Only God I saw.
Myself with mine own eye I saw most clearly.
  But when I looked with Gods eyes only God I saw

This ode shows that "when the seeker makes control and cessation of all conscious thought, abandons all objects of perception; and attains "*fana*" or passing away; the mystic is now rapt in contemplation of the divine essence."[34]

In the course of mystical contemplation; advanced stages of consciousness are reached, while the mystic transcends towards a feeling of the unity of being. In this light, the heart of the "Sufi" mystic becomes an instrument for the final approach to enlightenment.

Transcendental Meditation in Hinduism

Unlike Islam, Hinduism has never been a full blown missionary religion. There has been no Hindu saint or prophet urging his people to spread the word of Lord Brahman to all corners of the earth. "However before the advent of Islam in India one find historical evidence indicating that Hinduism took its first

[34] Ibid., p. 60. Cf. R.A. Nicholson; *The Mystics of Islam*, pp. 60-61; William James. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1960, p. 371.

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half-hearted shot at becoming a missionary religion by extending its domain to the Indonesian Island and south east Asian region."[35]

Therefore the entire Hindu/Brahmanist system of meditation can be summarized into three general statements. The ultimate reality is transcendental being or bliss consciousness; which is the basic nature of man, and it is accessible to anyone who uses the technique of transcendental meditation.

This technique has two distinctive aspects first, "the effort of experience thought in to finest possible state until the active experiencing mind goes below the mental to the source of thought. Second the use of mantra; or thought sound by which to lead the mind past meaning to creative calm."[36]

In the Buddhist "Theravada" school the argument is similar, and different versions of the four noble truths are shared in all Buddhist traditions: all persons are suffering; and suffering from the fires of lust hatred and illusion. This illusion resides in the mind, the mind must be purified by a strenuous course of training which will destroy the illusion and produce instead the conscious awareness of reality in which there is mind only and no self. This is a process of mental liberation.[37]

Mental liberation in Buddhism leads to control the mind to avoid emotion or self though to enable the mind to work as an instrument for the final approach to Enlightenment, and to work far from the limitations of such an instrument by using mind itself. "Bhavana, or process of mental liberation has two stages. The first stage is 'satipatthana' in which the mind is controlled trained to see things as they are without emotion

[35] Joseph Needleman: The New Religions, New York: Double day and Co., 1970, p. 213.

[36] Robert McDermott & V.S. Naravane, *The Spirit of Modern India*. New York; Tomas Y. Crowell co., 1974; p. 200.

[37] Christamas Aumphery; *Exploring Buddhism*, p. 177.

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or thought of self; and prepared as a hand-wrought instrument for the final approach to Enlightenment."

In the second stage the aim is to transcend the limitation of the epistemic structure modes of thinking and its strengthening by worldly tasks. In this vein, Humphry, states one should cut early the obstacles towards spiritual peace; the last stages of the salvation process are achieved only via a disciplined mind;[38] at that point the seeker reaches the stage of "vispassana"[39] or the spiritual insight-or the advanced stage of consciousness.

It is necessary, for meditation, to cleanse the mind of all distraction originating from external factors and prepare it for the more difficult stage of meditative method. Reflecting towards beyond the sensual experience, is indeed a unique experience, as often, the mind feels disturbances by emotions and desires and oblivious under the influences of the outer world.

Now the contents which the mind confronts are of two kinds; first the information retained and modified by memory of imagination; and second the awareness that the information belongs to oneself. It is the understanding the "Antavegas" that aims at controlling and eliminating both these mental contents altogether. Once the student of yoga implies his/her mind of all superficial modification, whether caused by external or internal factors, "he will be able to grasp his true reality."[40]

Dharana; Dayana; and Somadhi, "The Antrangas" are three stages that constitute stag of meditation in terms of the intensity concentration. Ashok Malhotra says "Dharana being the first step is the lowest level. Here the student deliberately fixes his mind on one idea; image or a limited mental content. . . the

[38] Ibid., p. 177.
[39] Ibid., p. 177.
[40] Ashok Malhotra, *On Hindu Philosophies of Experience; Cults Mysticism and Meditation*. State University of New York, at Oneonta. pp. 30, 31.

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student requires less and less effort to keep his mind within limited mental sphere; thus he moves towards the second step of Dhyana. Here the mind can immediately focus on any mental image. . . after perfecting the seven steps, the student confronts the final obstacle; the last hindrance is the ego sense of mind's awareness of itself as an object; in the Samadhi stage this interruption is eliminated completely; thus Samadhi marks the suspension of all ordinary mental activity and the student experiences his real self in terms of complete freedom and pure consciousness. Then the student of yoga read. . . his salvation."[41]

Here we discover that the total self realization is the goal of the yoga student. Meditation with its eight steps or through eight step meditative technique makes possible various changes, such as "strength and energy; cheerfulness and unique focus. Superlative happiness perfection of the sense organs and body; body develops resistance to disease fatigue and strain; and the development of tremendous all power; the student also comes to possess the following powers. . . He carries around him an aura of peace and inspires love and peace in others. . . He is able to gain knowledge of his former lives; he develops the power to project himself into another body and finally he develops ability to travel through [the path]."[42]

"Robert Wallace" and "Herbert Benson"[43] conducted research to determine the degree of physiological and psychological change brought about by the practice of transcendental Meditation. It was found that meditation helps decrease oxygen consumption and heart rate, and increase skin resistance. Their research shows[44] that transcendental Meditation was not

[41] Ibid., p. 31.
[42] Ibid., p. 32. Cf. B.K. Anand; 65; *China and Bolder Singh. Some Aspects*.
[43] Robert Wallace ad Herbert Benson, "The Physiology of Meditation", in *Scientific American* Vol. 226, No. 2, 1972, pp. 84-90. Cf. Ashok Malhotra. *Mysticism and Meditation*; pp. 35-36.

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only conducive to significant physical changes but also made possible an altered state of consciousness.

In an attempt to replicate the results of this research, Wallace and Benson studied the physiological effects of meditation on 36 subjects at the Thorndike Memorial; Laboratory and the University of California at Irvine in 1977 issue of science Dr. Wallace and Benson corroborated the results of the earlier study. Based upon the findings, "Wallace designates this state of consciousness as hypermetabolic; this notion is different from the wakeful dreaming and sleeping state of consciousness. Hence the research of Benson and Wallace reveals not only the physiological effects of meditation but also indicates the presence of a level of consciousness which until recently was talked of theologians and religionists in highly esoteric terms."[45]

The process of contemplation starts with concentration and meditation then contemplation. Concentration which is a term far wider than attentiveness begins with the practice of attention full impersonal. Such faculty is necessary for all people to acquire work successfully. Humphery states "concentration is the creation of the instrument; Meditation is the right use of it, contemplation transcends it."[46]

In Buddhism mind should be trained to obedience to be able to develop powers not possessed by ordinary people. "As the inner development continues the personality grows less; the withdrawal of energy from its worldly affairs it may tend to fade out in the eyes of men; the sole motive for meditation is to purge the self of illusion; to develop the faculty of intuition to the point of Enlightenment to desire this Enlightenment if desire at all, for the sake of one mind."[47]

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[44] Ibid., p. 86.
[45] Ibid., pp. 68–90.
[46] Christams Humphery, *Exploring Buddhism*; pp. 178, 179.

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Here the vision of the mystic contains an existential perception of the presence and Being of God; a Joyous apprehension of the absolute, and a new vision of the phenomenal world.

Happold says "This new vision of the phenomenal world is essentially one of immanence of the on."[48]

"This new vision is clear in Buddhism; Christams Humphrey say contemplation is an impersonal awareness of the essence of the entity observed, when self is purged from the mind of the observer, the trinity of seer, seen and the seeing is dissolved and the seer sees by becoming the essence of the thing observed."[49]

Contemplation; Illumination, and Ecstasy

It is well known now that contemplation is accompanied with a new vision of world. The intentional experience, often expressed by the "heart" becomes capable of Divine presence- not visible to the bodily eye. In this vein, the Muslim Mystic develops a kind of spiritual heart through the processes of concentration meditation and contemplation. God becomes visible to the inward sight.

The light of intuitive certainty (*Yagin*) by which the heart sees God is received allegorically as a beam of God's own light cast therein by Himself-According to a mystical interpretation of the famous passage in the Qur'an when the light of Allah is compared to a candle. "Burning in a lantern of transparent glass which is placed in a niche. . . "[50]

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[47] Ibid., pp. 180-181.
[48] Ibid., p. 90.
[49] Exploring Buddhism, p. 184.
[50] R.A. Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 52.

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The light which gleams in the heart of the illuminated mystic endows him with a supernatural power of discernment *firasat* which is the result of knowledge and insight metaphorically called "light or 'inspiration' which God creates and bestows upon his favorites."[51]

It is said in the tradition "Beware of the decrement of the true believer for he sees by the light of Allah."[52]

It seems now that contemplation is a result of Meditation and concentration on the thought of God as mentioned before through Meditation the mystic is engaged in mentioning God as (archetypal-memory) recollection or (*Dhiker*) is always thinking and always remembering God the Mystics "Sufis" make a practice of repeating the name of God or some religious words accompanied with the mechanical intonation with an intense concentration of every faculty upon mentioning God.

In mentioning God the mystic forgets himself first and then he becomes absorbed in the object of worship through recollection the seeker enters the state of trance "passing away".

In such state the mystic goes through a kind of concentration and meditation.

Nicholson says "in meditation (*murakabat*) we recognize a form of self-concentration similar to the Buddhist Dayana and Samadhi."[53] That means that in Islamic mysticism we can find out the traces of the Buddhist path in *dayna* or *Samadh*; far in both ways the seeker resist his desires and passions.

Concerning the methods of mortification there are similarities between Islamic mysticism and Hindu philosophies. "Fasting, silence, and solitude are some of the higher ethical discipline here and there."[54]

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[51] Ibid., p. 51.
[52] Ibid., p. 50.
[53] Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*; p. 48.

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"Self mortification is often expressed as a moral transmutation of the inner man, when they say die before ye die they do not mean to assert that the lower self can be essentially destroyed but it should be purged of its attributes which are wholly evil."[55]

Through this way the mystic realizes the transcendence of the Divine, and a transcendental vision of God comes through a moment of illumination. Here writes Rusbroeck "he meets God without intermediary.. there shines into him a simple light and this light shows him Darkness and Nakedness and Nothingness.. for he is vanquished by the working of God's abysmal love, and a furtive inclination of his spirit he vanquishes God,[56] and becomes one spirit with him."[57]

In this very highest degree of contemplation the seeker loses all abilities of perception and discernment of all things; only the vision of God that overwhelms all other visions.

Happold describe the vision of the mystic as a unique knowledge of the absolute. He says "The vision of the mystic not only contain an extensional perception of the presence and Being of God, a joyous prehension of the Absolute; of the reality up-holding all things; but is also a new vision of the phenomenal world . . . which is essentially one of immanence of the one."[58] And because the vision of God is the end Goal of the mystic; Muslim mystics are always careful of being veiled. Sari Saqti states "O God, whatever punishment thou must inflict upon me, do not punish me with the humiliation of being

[54] Ibid., p. 40.
[55] Ibid., p. 41.
[56] Cf. E. Underhill, *A Study in the Nature and the Development of Man's spiritual Consciousness*; pp. 340-344.
[57] Tuoler. "The Inner Way Quoted in Underhill", *Mysticism Anthology*, Section 19. Cf. Happold; *Mysticism*, p. 87.
[58] Happold, Mysticism, p. 90.

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veiled from thee; because if I am not veiled from thee, my torment and affliction will be lightened by recollection and contemplation of the even thy bounty will be deadly to me."[59]

According to the Sufis, in recollection, meditation and contemplation evoke for the seekers a feeling of self security and satisfaction. He also feels calm and tranquility.

As, according to Muslim tradition, God says in the Holy Qur'an "Whoever submits His whole self to God and is a doer of Good; God will give him his reward; He should feel no fear; no grieve."[60]

According to the Holy Qur'an, God says too that "In mentioning God hearts feel security."[61]

Conclusion

This essay reveals the very similarities among most kinds of Mysticism in practicing Meditation and contemplation.

In Buddhism, Dhayana, yoga, Christianity and Islam the goal of the Mediator is to link the disciple to self realization; here, self realization is achieved by a gnosis of a mystical union with the absolute, that is ultimate being (the One of the mystics).

In Islamic Mysticism Meditation means '*moraqabat*' or concentration upon the thought of God; that means; that the Mystic watches over God and realizes that God watches over him all time.

This article started with the assumption that meditation is the Royal way to contemplation; while contemplation is the

[59] R.A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*; p. 54.
[60] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Bqrah; 112
[61] Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Raad, 28; Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Omran, 126; Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Omran, 141.

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open gate to the vision of God, since contemplation is a movement of consciousness towards a higher level after the withdrawal of attention from the sensible world, it can achieve this goal according to the Muslim tradition of meditation in Sufism.

Contemplating God is assumed to be the practice assumed to govern the ability of the mind and the capacity of the natural heart; therefore the seeker with the help of the sage-mediator moves toward a supernatural heart and a mind of abilities and facilities that enable the mystic to attain the spiritual vision of God here we can speak about the power of '*fararsa*' or discernment, the power of the insight "spiritual eyes in the heart", and the power of the transcendental imagination.

In Buddhism, "Bhavana" or the process of mental liberation leads to control of the mind to avoid emotion or self though; it leads to the assumpito the assumption that we would be able to work with the mind as an instrument for the final approach to Enlightenment, and it leads to the assertion that we can work far from the limitation of the natural mind to be able to contemplate God; at this point the seeker reaches the stage of "vispassana" or what is called the spiritual insight both in Islamic mysticism and Buddhism.

It was found out that transcendental meditation leads to significant physical changes as well as biological effects and an altered state of consciousness different from ordinary states.

In Buddhism, Christianity; and Islam, the mind should be trained to obedience to develop powers over the natural power as mentioned before; to enable the mind to withdraw energy from its worldly affairs; to find the sole motive for meditation is to purge the self of illusion; to develop the faculty of intuition to the point of Enlightenment is the final goal.

According to Nicholson Evelyn Underhill and F.C. Happold contemplation is a state of self forgetting attention; contemplation is a state of self in the form of a still steady "Gaze";

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contemplation is a state of self in intense concentration so that emotion, will and thought are all fused and lost in something of a deeper and deeper process of self merging; of passing away; or annihilated in the contemplation of the oneness of God. The concepts of personal and impersonal, transcendence and immanence, beginning and ending, unity and multiplicity cease to have meaning. In the sense of the *Rig Veda*, from One we come, to One we go.

Contemplation is accompanied with a state annihilation of the alienated ego and blending with the persistence essence (*baqa'*), seeking union with the divine like realm. In this vein, Mohammad Ibn Wasi, utters "I never saw anything without seeing God therein," Shibil said "I never saw anything except God i.e. in the rapture of love and the favor of contemplation."[62]

As a result there are two kinds of contemplation; the former is the result of the state of ecstasy and passing away into the thought of God. The second is as a result of rapturous love.

When Nuri was questioned concerning the origin of mystical discernment "firasat" he answered by quoting the Qi'anic verse in which God says that He breathed his spirit into Adam. In this context, Nuri affirms that "firasat" is the result of knowledge and insight metaphorically called "light" or "inspiration" according to Nicholson.[63]

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[62] R.A. Nicholson; *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 55.
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Knowing about Right and Wrong: Why Is It Wrong to Kill Innocent People?

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz

Abstract: In this article I challenge the positivist view that ethical statements are merely an expression of our emotions or preferences. I consider a moral statement, "Killing innocent civilians is wrong," and argue that such a statement is a truthful moral norm. I show that what is fundamental to agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. Scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes scientific attitude. However, knowledge in morals does not presuppose indifference, but love. Once we accept that our thoughts and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

One of the key characteristics of modern science is objectivity. Scientific knowledge is held to be independent of attitudes, beliefs, and other subjective states of mind of individual scientists. However, just as scientific knowledge, derived from observation, presupposes the "scientific attitude" of being a detached, objective observer, so also its verification and sharing with other members of the scientific community requires the same attitude. Without this attitude, science would neither be

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objective nor inter-subjective.[64] Objectivity and "scientific attitude" are thus interrelated. If this is the case, objective scientific knowledge is not independent of the human mind as is commonly believed. It is dependent upon the states of mind which constitute scientific attitude: on being indifferent, disinterested, neutral and impartial.

Being a disinterested, objective observer can be contrasted with being engaged. Once we engage in something, we are no longer indifferent or neutral. We take a personal stand on something. Taking a stand on different issues, holding beliefs, being emotionally and personally involved in many life situations are all characteristic of everyday life. Scientific attitude, which can best be described by the words "neutrality" or "indifference," thus lies in direct opposition to the everyday human attitude based on preferences and feelings. But indifference, a lack of feeling, is a state of mind as well. Once we comprehend that objectivity in science presupposes scientific attitude as its foundation, we can no longer accept the view that objective scientific knowledge is free from subjectivity. There is subjectivity in scientific objectivity, namely, indifference.

Looking at the world indifferently as if it were an object, which is the view of a detached, objective observer, is a way of relating to it from a certain perspective. The pursuit of objectivity leads to abstraction from the individual scientist's personal position in the world. Thomas Nagel goes so far as to assert that "objectivity involves not only a departure from one's individual viewpoint, but also as far as possible, departure from specifically

[64] The way in which empirical scientists look at the world is sometimes described as 'scientific attitude.' In order to be objective observers, they must be disinterested, neutral, and impartial. See W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 5th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003), p. 10.

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human or even mammalian viewpoint"[65] and allows us to look at the world "not from a place within it, but from nowhere in particular".[66] The move toward objectivity, he claims, reveals things as they are in themselves, and not as they appear to be. Objective knowledge, thus obtained, is a true account of the actual world. Is this view justified?

Firstly, one can make an objection and argue that there is no knowledge without the knower. The "view from nowhere" must always be a "view from somewhere."[67] An individual scientist can abstract from his or her position in the world, his or her preferences and feelings, but cannot go beyond his or her subjectivity in the form of scientific attitude. A complete abstraction from human personality so as to transcend subjectivity and a specifically human or even mammalian viewpoint cannot be conceived of and hence is impossible.

The form of subjectivity which refers to scientific attitude has been described by the word "indifference." Empirical scientists look at the world "objectively," indifferently, as if it were an object. Ideally speaking, they do not enter into personal relationships with the objects of their inquiry. Yet, as I will argue further, by looking at the world in this way, one can learn about them only from a certain viewpoint. An objective account will

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[65] Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective" in *Post-Analytic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 42.

[66] Ibid., p. 41.

[67] The phrase "view from nowhere" alludes to Thomas Nagel's book, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). It was coined by Lorraine Code to describe the epistemological position of a detached observer. See Lorraine Code, *Rhetorical Spaces* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

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omit something.[68] Therefore, scientific knowledge can give us only a partial and not a complete picture of the actual world. Moreover, if objective, scientific knowledge is a partial one, it cannot claim to reveal what things are like in themselves. It cannot know things as they are themselves, but only as objects.

Our knowledge is not independent from our state of mind. Objective knowledge is impossible without the scientific attitude of being a detached, neutral observer. The basic emotional states of mind are indifference, love and hate. Indifference can be defined as suspension of feeling, or a lack of feeling towards something. It is the form of subjectivity which is necessary condition for a disinterested process of inquiry and objective knowledge. By contrast, love and hate are two opposing feelings, expressing respectively inclination and disinclination towards something. I shall now analyze the influence of these on our knowledge.

The most striking example of hate can be found in the situation of war. In war, both sides, driven by antagonistic interests, do violence to each other. This gives rise to the passion of hatred: disinclination towards the other side. If I am disinclined towards something, I do not wish to have anything to do with it, and particularly, to know it as it is. Hence, hate does not result in knowledge. It produces and reinforces prejudices that disfigure facts and contribute to false beliefs. To be sure, in the situation of war we can also find some objective knowledge that is instrumental in the destruction of the enemy. Soldiers, trained into instruments of war, may learn how to destroy their enemies effectively. They are not interested in them as persons,

[68] Nagel, "Subjective and Objective," in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, p. 45. Nagel notices that the pursuit of objectivity is not an effective method of reaching truth about everything, but he does not draw from this point appropriate consequences.

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but as objects of possible annihilation. In short, indifference may give rise to objective knowledge which is a partial knowledge, but hatred does not give rise to any knowledge at all.

If hate results in separation in strife, love brings about unity. Perhaps the simplest example of love can be found in motherhood. The way in which a loving mother knows her child goes beyond knowing objective properties such as the child's weight or height. Taking care of the child's growth, she cherishes the way in which the child speaks, smiles, walks. Her knowledge requires constant learning: how to respond to and act towards her child in diverse situations. It cannot be reduced to simple, observational propositions. Now, could it be that what the mother knows is unjustified? Is her knowledge nothing more but a collection of illusions, prejudices, emotions and preferences? Can we truly know a person in any other way than as an object or a collection of facts?

How is it possible to know another person? Positivistic epistemology which is dominant in today's social sciences denies that we can know another person in a different way than as a physical object. Human beings are assumed to be egoistic, self-interested, pleasure-seeking, rational individuals.[69] We can learn about them only by observing their behavior. What happens in their minds is neither publicly available nor even considered important.

The basic assumption which underlies the epistemology of positivist social science can be traced to the thesis of physicalism. In the words of A. J. Ayer, the thesis is that "to say anything about a person's thoughts, or feelings, or sensations, or private experiences of any kind, is always equivalent to saying something about his physical conditions or behaviour."[70] The ground

[69] Neuman, p. 72.
[70] A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (New York: Penguin, 1984), p. 210.

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for this thesis is the belief in the privacy of experience. Mental states, such as our thoughts, feelings, or sensations are considered private. They are things to which we alone have access. The possibility of their communication is denied. By contrast, physical objects: material things and their behaviour, belong to the public world. They are held to be public because of conjecture that different people can perceive them in a like manner. Consequently, only observational statements, statements about physical objects, can be verifiable and produce knowledge. Knowledge is observational. Thus, according to the positivistic view, when we speak about our mental states, we can refer to our own experiences; but when we speak about the mental states of others, we can refer only to other persons' observational behaviour which corresponds to their mental states.[71] Our talk about minds is translated into talk about bodies.

There is, however, a difficulty with the belief in the privacy of experience which supports the thesis of physicalism. It is inconsistent with everyday practice. Firstly, as a matter of fact both in science and in everyday discourse we communicate our thoughts to others. It is difficult to imagine how, without communication of thoughts and ideas, there could be accumulation of knowledge, and how education and science could be possible. Further, we can communicate not only our thoughts to others, but also our attitudes and feelings. If scientific attitude, based on indifference, is a part of proper scholarly conduct and is learned and internalized during many years of schooling,[72] it is because it can be communicated and plays a vital role in scientific activity. It must be shared by scientists to ensure the objectivity and inter-subjectivity of research.

[71] Ibid, p. 215.
[72] Neuman, p. 9.

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If thoughts and feelings are declared incommunicable, then we can know other persons only as physical objects, by observing them. However, even if, as Ayer maintains, "different people can share the same thoughts and feelings, but they are not literally the same,"[73] and thus a possibility for misunderstanding is open, it does not mean that communication between humans is impossible. Hence, as I will show below, the distinction between private experiences and public objects is ill founded. The objective limitation set on the knowledge of other persons must be declared erroneous.

Our inability to have direct access to the thoughts and feelings of others stems from our being separated individuals. Our separation imparts also our ability to communicate with other people. Speaking about communication, there is always a question as to whether or not the words which we use to describe our private experiences have the same meaning for us and for others. Ayer claims that there is no possible adjustment of our situation as humans by which our separateness could be overcome.[74]

It is true that from the point of view of our bodies, we are distinct, separated individuals. As a physical object, one is clearly not somebody else. But it is not so obvious that we are always separated with respect to our minds. Our mental separateness is a dynamic process. Sharing the same vocabulary and the same values connects people more closely to one another, and makes them less separated in their minds. On the other hand, antagonistic interests and hatred divide people and set them apart. Even some strictly private experiences like our childhood memories, dreams, or concerns can either be shared

[73] Ayer, p. 199.
[74] Ibid, p. 217.

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with other persons of our choice, eventually thus creating a mutual understanding and a sense of emotional unity, or be kept secret.

In each human being there is a deeply rooted need to overcome his or her separateness from others.[75] We fulfil this need in various ways when we seek the attention, acceptance or admiration of others. But the real adjustment of our situation as humans by which separateness is overcome is love. It is the feeling which brings us together. Further, as I will attempt now to show, just like objective scientific knowledge presupposes a scientific attitude, so non-objective but inter-subjective moral knowledge needs a loving attitude as its foundation.

Let us consider a moral statement: "Killing innocent civilians is wrong."[76] Such a statement would probably be true for most rational beings, but not for everyone, as examples taken from wars can show. It is neither tautological, true solely because of the meaning of its terms, nor empirical because it does not make an assertion about any physical object and cannot be verifiable by sense-experience. Since, in light of positivistic epistemology, statements have meanings only if they are either tautological or empirically verifiable, it follows that the statement "Killing innocent civilians is wrong" is meaningless.[77] Still, is this correct? Is the statement "Killing innocent civilians is wrong" merely an expression of feelings and preferences and not a truthful norm based on knowledge? We know that something is

[75] Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York, Harper & Row, 1974), p. 8.
[76] Ayer's example of a moral statement was: "Stealing is wrong." I believe that my statement provides a more clear case of a moral norm.
[77] This is exactly what Ayer asserted about his "Stealing is wrong."

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the case if we have reasons believe that it can not be otherwise. What are the possible reasons to believe that the statement, "Killing innocent civilians is wrong," is true; whereas its opposite, "Killing innocent civilians is right," is false?

Most of us have never seen face-to-face the actual killing of civilians. However, once we accept that human experiences are not incommunicable, we can understand the meaning of the phrase "killing innocent civilians." It refers to depriving of life and often subjecting to extreme suffering people who are not legitimate military targets, who, being neither combatants nor criminals, are not guilty of anything. Killing innocent civilians is a crime committed in war.[78] If this is so, killing innocent civilians must surely be wrong. Yet, how do we know this? Instances of such a crime still occur. As some people say, in war anything goes. The killing of civilians is explained by the circumstances of war in which the opposing sides, moved by their own interests and zeal for victory, are impatient with all restraint. There are thus individuals who believe that killing innocent civilians is right. Why are they wrong?

There are disagreements about moral issues. For people who hate others or are indifferent towards them, a moral norm that obstructs the pursuit their interests cannot possibly be anything more than mere words. It will refers to no experiences which they can assimilate as their own and to no value that they can share with others. What is fundamental to an agreement in the realm of both facts and morals is a commonly shared attitude that determines human relatedness to the world. My claim is that in science it is the scientific attitude of being an objective,

[78] The deliberate killing of civilians is crime and military commanders who order, encourage or tolerate such murder are fully responsible for it. They must take steps to avoid and limit even unintended civilian deaths. But in war killing innocent civilians may sometimes be unavoidable. See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 316-325.

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detached observer, but in ethics it is the loving attitude, the attitude of affective engagement. Without this attitude rational consensus in morals is impossible.

The moral statement, "Killing innocent civilians is wrong," is neither a tautology nor an empirical statement. However, the statement is not just a meaningless expression of feelings. It is not factually, but morally meaningful. Its meaningfulness does not depend upon verifiable facts, but upon its being a true norm which all rational beings whose attitude is love will accept. This statement is both meaningful and true because, once we understand, in the context of reciprocal communication of our experiences, what killing innocent civilians means and what it implies, we can say with full conviction that it is morally wrong and it can never be right.

"The only way to full knowledge lies in the act of love."[79] But what kind of status does such a moral knowledge have? Once we accept that our experiences, thoughts and feelings, are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective knowledge which is derived from a rational consensus between individuals who exchange, share and debate their experiences; who can say, "we know that something is the case and have good reasons to be sure." There is thus a moral universal knowledge which goes beyond scientific objectivity: knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

[79] Fromm, p. 26.

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Decision Ethics in Business and Economics

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Strategies for Sustainability of Community Banks in a Time of Too-Big-to-Fail Banking Policies

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After the end of the Vietnam War, the defense industry in the United States was downsized and restructured into a few large corporations. The federal government saw these surviving companies as too-big-to-fail and worthy of government subsidy. In effect it exempted them from antitrust laws for reasons of national security. For example, the Defense Department forced McDowell-Douglas to merge its airplane manufacturing business with Boeing when it failed to gain sufficient market share in manufacturing large airplanes to serve the airline industry and military markets. This was despite the existence of some potential acquirers from outside the United States who were apparently willing to purchase McDonnell-Douglas at a higher price than Boeing.

In the last few years, as a result of the great recession or financial panic that began in 2007, the US federal government has been moving in a variety of key industries towards a new regulatory and industrial structure based upon European models and its earlier restructuring of the defense industry after downsizing. A variety of methods have been used by the federal government to protect the few chosen corporations deemed too-big-to-fail. In some cases, the federal government has nationalized part of the services provided by private corporations. In others, selected firms have been bailed out, with the government gaining control of some stock in the chosen companies. Elsewhere, Congress has legislated limits on competition to protect key companies, as in some sections of the new health care laws designed to

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protect big pharmaceutical and big insurance companies in exchange for limited resistance in passage of the laws from these companies. These government policies have been particularly important in changing regulatory behavior and industrial structure in such key industries as automotive manufacturing, insurance, banking, and "big pharma".

Banking has seen great regulatory changes and much restructuring of corporations as a result of the great recession and financial panic that began in 2007. Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac have had all their long-term financial obligations guaranteed by the federal government. The government has helped force the replacement of key executives in these two corporations. One of the provisions of the new health care legislation nationalized most of the student loan business formerly served by private financial institutions in student loans. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds were used to bail out large banks and the government ended lip with a lot of stock in Citibank, which it is in the process of attempting to sell. The government encouraged or perhaps helped force the Bank of America to purchase Merrill Lynch. Wachovia was encouraged to be acquired by Citibank but managed instead to be acquired by Wells Fargo at a higher price. A large number of smaller banks with limited capital were forced to close or be absorbed by larger banks.

Too-big-to-fail policies and other government regulatory policies imposed by the federal government on the banking industry have hurt the sustainability of community banks. A report released on May 13, 2010 by the Congressional Oversight Panel, a group set up to oversee funds allocated by the federal government Troubled Asset Relief Program (Elizabeth Warren, Chairman) claimed that the TARP programs did not improve access to credit by smaller businesses. The oversight panel said that small business lending values at the smallest banks fell by about 2.7%, compared with a 0.2% decline in their overall lending.

The report states that there are some ``banks that state that they are able, willing, and eager to increase lending but that the current regulatory climate makes this extremely difficult''. The report notes that there are more than 700 banks on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations "watch list" of institutions in danger of failing. (Emily Maltby, "Bailout Missed Main Street, New Report Says", *Wall Street Journal*, May 14, 2010, p.B6).

Some directors and CEOs of community banks who have recently attended meetings sponsored by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC have reported to shareholders of community banks that these two federal regulatory agencies have encouraged community banks to increase mortgage lending, When these bank directors and CEOs return to their banks, they find that the local examiners and other federal and state regulators require more conservative lending than the bankers would expect giving the exhortations of high officials of the Federal Reserve and FDIC to loan more money.

Another part of the problem for community banks lending is due to the downward spiral of values for residential and commercial real estate since 2007. There are fewer potential borrowers out there that can meet the current regulatory standards. One particular problem is the decreasing values of real estate in both residential and commercial markets, Meanwhile uncertainty in regards to the overall economic picture has reduced the number of loans being made since the borrowers have to put up larger down payments even while overall prices plummet.

Some community banks have long had good lending businesses in providing construction loans to builders who build or rehab these homes on speculation, In the current market of depressed valuations, builders have often found that they can't sell these homes for more than they have expended in purchasing and building the homes or adding improvements. Accordingly,

this market for community bank loans has dried up in many communities.

In the past, community banks were able to invest deposits, especially those in highly liquid accounts such as demand deposits, savings accounts, and money market accounts into short-term treasuries and commercial paper, In order to keep the economy out of recession, the Federal Reserve has cut interest dramatically, Short-term treasuries and commercial paper now pay interest rates not far above zero, Essentially these funds were provided to the Treasury and corporations by community banks but are now being provided by the Federal Reserve through quantitative easing. To be sure, community banks can borrow money through deposits and lend at higher interest rates, but the very low interest rate has greatly depressed demand to deposit in banks, drying up sources of capital. Moreover, the spreads on capital held in demand or near demand deposits and short term paper have become too small to cover overhead, Typically small banks need spreads of at least 1.5% to break even, but on demand or near demand deposits, interest rate spreads may be as small as 0.25%.

As a result of the decline in lending to builders, the decline of residential mortgages, and historically low interest rates, profits at community banks have decreased significantly or have been turned into losses. A typical conservatively run community bank would traditionally have used its profits for three purposes: one third reinvested in operations to improve the bank and provide better service to bank customers, one third used to pay dividends and buy back stock, and one third used to increase bank reserves. The disappearance of profits in many community banks have forced the banks to draw back from these policies. Many community banks have been forced to eliminate or reduce dividends and to end share buy backs. This has caused significant share price declines for community banks.

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Banks have also been forced to curtail improvements to operations to conserve funds in the absence of profits. The need to increase reserves for loans that do not perform adequately has increased greatly. Community banks have had to use funds for this purpose and often have had to show losses instead of profits to do so.

Because of the decline of profitable lending opportunities in the current real estate mortgage and builders markets, and the need to increase reserves for possible bad debts, more community banks have faced the need to raise more equity capital at a time when stock prices are declining to meet increased reserve requirements of current federal policy. Some banks have had to issue additional stock at such low prices that existing shareholders face considerable dilution. Other community banks have been forced to merge into larger banks on unfavorable terms to shareholders (effective loss of capital to existing shareholders due to the ratio of exchange of their shares for shares of the acquiring bank) to avoid having to be closed. Still other community banks have been taken over by the FDIC or other government agencies and sold to large banks with total loss to shareholders and reduced payments to some debt holders of the bank.

The decline of the number of independent community banks may have unfavorable long term effects on our banking system as independent community banks add a great deal to the strength and innovation to our banking system as compared to some other countries where only a few large banks are allowed to exist. A vibrant community banking sector compares favorably with a system where too-big-to-fail banks are accorded significant regulatory advantages, thus reducing competition innovation.

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Community banks have several great advantages over national banks. First they typically are focused on traditional commercial banking and do not face the high risks of investment banking. If anything, credit default swaps and other derivative securities caused as much or more damage as loan defaults to large banks. Second, community banks have a comparative advantage relating to their local focus . Turnover among employees, especially senior staff is smaller. The employees, even senior staff, tend to live in the local area for long periods of time Board membership is drawn from local business people who can directly lend their skills to the operation and oversight of the banks. Thus, the community banks have superior knowledge of ambient conditions and individuals than larger national banks. This allows for more personalized and friendlier service. It also generates more information about loans and should lead, all else equal, to lower default rates. Compare this to national banks with high turnovers among staff, rotation of management from other regions, and centralized decision structures in large banking hubs, far from the influence of local business people. In short the national bank is largely unresponsive to local conditions and less capable of processing community specific information.

There are several disadvantages of community banks vis-it-vis national banks. Being commercially focused means that there may be fewer avenues of revenue generation as compared to a universal bank. National banks may be less prone to regional downturns by serving a myriad of regions. A community bank in one specific locality runs the risk that the locality itself will suffer severe economic stress, as seen in places heavily connected to the automotive industry and where the real estate bubble was most pronounced. Community banks drawing from a local region may also have a more limited supply of capital to invest than a national bank. Finally national banks are likely to have

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immense political clout to secure preferential legislative action or to secure stabilization funding from various sources.

One method for community banks to improve their performance and to better meet the challenge of competing with national banks is to adopt a new corporate structure that leverages the comparative advantages of community banking while minimizing the drawbacks. To achieve this, a new bank holding corporation will be created. The holding corporation will acquire through merger or tender offer many community banks in a wide selection of localities, both geographically and economically. Instead of integrating new acquisitions as branches of a national bank, the holding company will allow the community banks to continue operating under their old names and management. The community banks will continue to retain large degrees of independence and with strong local control. The holding bank will provide centralized services for marketing, stock promotion, back office operations, and accounting. The holding bank will also provide a form of reinsurance among the community banks, stabilizing those in regions particularly shocked by localized economic downturns and providing a national pool of capital to local projects. This relationship is a federalized one for banking like the states and the federal government. One might also compare it to a franchise, where most local franchise are owned and operated by local business people with loose but effective oversight from the national chain. Finally one might also compare it to a central bank, only that this central bank would be in some kind of partnership with the local banks and be operated as a wholly private, non-government system, compared to the Federal Reserve system, which is effectively controlled by Washington and dominated by the large national banks. The local banks would pay a franchise fee of sorts to the holding corporation, and stock ownership would be split among local leaders and national shareholders.

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Community banks have one natural avenue of revenue that is not as competitive for national banks. That is in fees from services, by providing a cornucopia of financial services to customers who must navigate an increasingly complex financial landscape. Examples are dealing with foreign currencies, bank checks, overdrafts, and so on.

One interesting means of raising revenue that has generally been eschewed by community banks is advertising. These banks have large amounts of wall space that could potentially be devoted to advertising for local and national businesses. Certainly the high foot traffic by people with sufficient degrees of wealth to have accounts is a good value to advertisers.

The above suggestions and others that can be creatively developed will enable community banks to survive and grow in the future despite the current regulatory environment that favors too-big-to-fail banks.

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Help Hospitalized Veterans

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Help Hospitalized Veterans (HHV) is a charitable non profit organization that was founded in 1971 by Roger Chapin. This organization serves veterans of the United States armed forces who are recovering from combat by offering them a way to keep their minds and hands in motion. HHV delivers Arts and Crafts kits (originally Vietnam Gift Pacs) free of charge to hospitalized veterans receiving medical treatment at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facilities, state veterans homes and military centers. Craft kit specialists who are trained in patient assistance are sent to these facilities to provide support to this program. The gift kits help reduce the patients boredom, provide an alternative to watching hours of television and improves their overall morale.

In order to cover the cost of producing the gift kits and distribute them to the facilities where they are used by the veterans, HHV needed to rely on donations from the public. Through various direct marketing solicitations, HHV was able to gain the support of generous donors. The cost of this fundraising is high. Between 1997 and 2005, HHV spent more than $200 million on fundraising and public education campaigns, according to a *Washington Post* analysis of federal tax filings. The public records also show that HHV awarded at least $19 million in contracts during that same period to companies owned by Richard A. Viguerie, an advertising consultant based in Virginia. (Washington Post.com. January 16, 2008).

HHV has distributed more than 23 million therapeutic arts and crafts kits to veterans at the medical facilities and other locations. With a simple caring donation of a craft kit, Help Hospitalized Veterans has brought millions of caring Americans closer

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to the men and women of the armed forces. HHV also has distributed craft kits, computers, internet access systems, videos and books to homebound Purple Heart recipients.

Aside from contributing to its own programs, HHV also provides financial support to other organizations such as the Coalition to Salute America's Heroes Foundation, National Veterans Creative Arts Festival, National Veterans Golden Age Games, Re-Creation (live entertainment variety shows for VA hospitals and nursing homes for veterans) and Bugles Across America (horn players for military funeral homes nationwide).

HHV has supported hospitalized veterans since the end of the Vietnam War. The arts and crafts kits supplied to these veterans have been valued by many of them. HHV is one of few veterans organizations that have given back to these veterans in such a constructive way. HHV has a dedicated group of donors who have supported the organization with repeated contributions. The organization has receive praise from these donors and from veterans who have been helped by the work of HHV.

HHV has also been criticized for its high expenses of fund raising and for its high operating expenses. The Better Business Bureau standards for charitable organizations suggest that charities spend at least 65 percent of their total expenses on program activities. According to data submitted by HHV on Form 990 for Fiscal Year 2006, HHV apparently satisfied this benchmark with 67 percent of its expenses used to fund program activities. (http://house.gov/documents/20080117103716.pdf.). In fiscal year 2007, according to Charity Navigator, Program Expenses were 60.2 percent (www.charitynavigator.org.).

One criticism has been of Roger Chapin's annual compensation package. From 2004 through 2006 Mr. Chapin and his wife received approximately 1.5 million dollars in salary,

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bonuses and pension contributions over these three years, including more than $560,000 in 2006. Chapin was also reimbursed for over $340,000 for meals, hotels, entertainment and other expenses. (*New York Times, An Intolerable Fraud,* February 8, 2008). Mr. Chapin received a total of $426,434 in salary and benefits and his wife, Elizabeth, received $113,623 as salary and benefits as "newsletter editor" in the prior fiscal year, according to a *Washington Post* review of a filing with the Internal Revenue Service (Washington Post.com. 2007). In fiscal year 2007, Mr. Chapin received compensation of $322,438 (0.56% of Expenses) for his services as President, Founder and Mike Lynch, Executive Director, received compensation of $261,617 for his services (0.46 of Expenses), according to Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org).

The American Institute of Philanthropy recommends that charities spend at least sixty percent of their funds on charitable programs. HHV has spent only 31 percent of its funds on charitable causes. (*The Washington Post,* January 17, 2008, Rucker, Philip, *"Scrutiny of Veteran Charities Continues; California Businessman Sees 'Witch Hunt'")* The *Washington Post* also reported that the American Institute of Philanthropy issued a report suggesting that Help Hospitalized Veterans and 19 other veterans charities managed their funds poorly, paying high overhead costs and direct-mail fundraising fees. Help Hospitalized Veterans purchased a condominium unit in Fairfax County (Virginia) for $446,600 according to property records reviewed by the Washington Post. Mr. Chapin said that the charity purchased the Falls Church condo because of his frequent travel to Washington. (Washington Post.com, January 16, 2008). There were other questionable expenses according to the *St. Petersburg Times,* including $100,000 to General Tommy Franks whose name was used on fund raising letters, a loan of $135,000 to

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help HHV's executive director Mike Lynch with his divorce settlement and $17,000 for country club dues. (St. Petersburg Times, January 22, 2008).

Charity Navigator has rated some charities in similar fields as follows as listed on their web site on February 28, 2009:

Charity Name	Score	Rating
Help Hospitalized Veterans	43.52	**
Army Emergency Relief	66.82	****
Air Force Aid Society	57.01	***
Special Operations Warrior Foundation	65.26	****
Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society	63.51	****

Rating is shown as stars out of four.
Source: www.charitynavigator.org February 28, 2009.

Table 1

When asked what would happen if his charities told donors how their donations were spent, Mr. Chapin replied: "If we disclose, which I'm more than happy to do, we'd all be out of business. Nobody would donate. It would all dry up." (*Washington Post*, January 18, 2008, *op. cit.)*

HHV claimed it raised 71 million dollars in 2006, included gifts in kind and spent $14.5 million dollars on program services for veterans. The American Institute of Philanthropy has conducted a study that graded veterans charities on the percentage of money raised that went to charitable activities. The grades were determined based on an analysis of audited financial statements and tax filings to formulate the grades. Based on their findings, the American Institute of Philanthropy gave HHV and its sister organizations a grade of F. (*Tribune Business*

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News, Washington, January 11, 2008. Dennis Yusko, *"Pennies on the dollar for veterans: Study: Donations often fail to reach those who served"*). Some other veterans organizations received higher ratings from the American Institute of Philanthropy such as Disabled American Veterans, National Military Family Association, and United Services Organization (USO). The fund raising results may be overstated since there is no explanation of the In-Kind Contributions of $21,960,700 listed among the sources of funds as shown on Exhibit One of this case.

According to Charity Navigator, HHV claimed total revenue of $58,953,435 in fiscal year 2007 and spent $34,139,787 on Program Expenses.

Currently there are no federal laws that regulate how much charities spend on fundraising and other overhead costs. Some states, such as New York State, do regulate charitable agencies through the state Attorney General, who in New York State does examine some charitable agencies to prevent fraud. Non profit charitable agencies are not required by any federal law or regulation to disclose their costs of raising funds and operating expenses in their solicitations for donations. HHV and other charitable organizations do disclose such numbers on their web sites and in annual reports.

Apparently there is a need for the services provided to veterans by HHV. Recently HHV has expanded their activities to

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Help Hospitalized Veterans Sources and Uses of Funds Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2006

Source of Funds	
Contributions	$48,551,490
In-Kind Contributions	21,960,760
Property sales gains	333,667
Other revenue	272,817
Investments	149,251
Income from leather sales (net)	4,144
Total Income	$71,272,126
Use of Funds	
Program Expenses	$47,203,541
Fund Raising Expenses	18,994,113
Administrative Expenses	3,153,791
Total Expenses	$69,351,445
Income in Excess of Expenses	$1,929,681
Beginning net assets	8,080 252
Ending net assets	$10,000,933

Source : http://charityreports.bbb.org/public/Report.aspx

Table 2

Exhibit Two Help Hospitalized Veterans Income Statement Fiscal Year Ending July 31, 2007

Revenue	
Primary Revenue	$57,715,394
Other Revenue	1,238,041
Total Revenue	$58,953,435
Expenses	
Program Expenses	$34,139,787
Administrative Expenses	3,725,432
Fundraising Expenses	18,807,080
Total Functional Expenses	$56,672,299
Payment to Affiliates	$0
Excess (or Deficit) for the year	$2,281,136
Net Assets	$12,607,020

Source: www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm

Table 3

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serve veterans in needs overseas. HHV now ships some of its crafts kits to these veterans overseas.

Teaching Note for Help Hospitalized Veterans

Synopsis

This case discusses Help Hospitalized Veterans, a charitable non profit organization, that raises funds to help hospitalized veterans recuperating in hospitals. The organization is now one of the largest veterans charities in the United States, reporting total income of more than $71 million in fiscal 2006 and almost $59 million in fiscal 2007. The spending practices of this organization on salaries and benefits for the founder and his family have raised questions and there have been questions about the high cost of fund raising and public educational campaigns.

Use and Objectives

This case is useful for both undergraduate and graduate students in non profit management courses or in business strategy courses.

Learning objectives include the following:

Helps the student become familiar with non profit management and its differences from for profit corporations (no shareholders, no income taxes for nonprofit income, differences in governance).

Helps the student learn that all non profit organizations are not operated in fact just to benefit the public. Some may be

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operated in fact to benefit the founders or managers of the organization rather than the public. Boards of trustees may be controlled by friends of the managers who do not care about the public interest.

Helps the student learn that non profit organizations just like for profit corporations must carry out normal business functions to succeed such as marketing, allocation of funds to cover obligations of the organization, human resources function , IT and other functions needed to at least break even financially while carrying out the mission of the organization.

Teaching Plan

This case is compiled from public sources, primarily newspaper articles and the website of the charity. Students may be requested to evaluate the situation facing HHV and decide what action should be taken by the members of the board of trustees of the organization and/or, by public authorities to reduce possible excess fundraising costs and to prevent questionable spending on salaries and benefits for the founder and other employees of public charities.

The Board of Trustees of HHV is not discussed in the case as there is not much information available from public sources on this board. While the focus of the case is on the issues facing this organization, this case can also be used as a springboard to a discussion on the role of a board of trustees in a non profit organization.

The instructor may wish to ask students what they should know about an organization before deciding to joint a board if asked to do so as a new outside independent trustee. Students usually respond with wanting to know what compensation they would receive for serving on the board of trustees of a non profit

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organization. Some students are often surprised to learn that members of boards of trustees do not normally receive any compensation for serving on the board of a non profit organization. Students also usually want to know what is the mission of the organization, its financial condition and other facts about the organization. Students often do not ask the most important question that should be asked before deciding whether or not to join the board of trustees of any organization. That question is "How much officers and directors liability insurance does the organization have to protect members of the board in event they are sued for alleged violation of due care or prudent person provisions of law in performing their legal duties on the board?" In some states, there is some charitable immunity to due care and prudent person rules regarding members of boards of trustees of non profit organizations under Good Samaritan Laws of the state. There is some risk of law suits for those who serve on non profit boards of trustees even if there is no compensation for such service. Serving on any board of trustees may cause extra risk from litigation that alleges that the member of the board did not act with due care (some states) or did not act as a prudent person (some other states).

Subjects and Issues

- Fund Raising Practices
- Compensation for executives in a charity

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- How best to help disabled veterans

Instructional Procedure

The intended audience for this case are undergraduate and graduate business school students as well as students in courses in nonprofit management. Business school students are often unfamiliar with the operation and problems of charitable organizations. They need to know more about such organizations as they may work for charitable organizations or may serve on the boards of trustees of charitable organizations in the future.

Essential to the best use of this case is the instructor's willingness to be engaged. It is apparent that the teaching method should be adapted to the cognitive style and intellectual competency of the students; but it should be interactive to the extent possible. The instructor will need to take the lead in this. It might be beneficial to discuss well known charities that students may be familiar with such as the American Red Cross, American Cancer Society or the March of Dimes among others in the context of the case. Possibly a member of the board of directors or an executive of a charity could be invited to answer student questions about the operation and fund raising practices of tax exempt charities.

Analysis-Questions for Discussion

1. How do charities decide their mission and purpose? The instructor may wish to use some examples here such as the founding of the March of Dimes by President Franklin Roosevelt and Basil O'Connor to try to conquer polio- a disease that was especially traumatic for children or the foundation

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of the international Red Cross movement to deal with the problems originally on the battlefield of those wounded in action. Students should be asked to look at Charity Navigator to learn better how some charities operate.

2. Is the mission and purpose of Help Hospitalized Veterans beneficial to society and to the veterans it serves? It could be argued that helping hospitalized veterans is a useful cause to help those who fought for their country and were seriously disabled as a result of doing so. Others might argue that this could be done more effectively and efficiently in raising the funds needed for this purpose by the Department of Veterans Affairs or by another charity that works with veterans such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars since the VFW is better known and could perhaps raise funds at lower cost. Perhaps these services should be provided by the Veterans Administration since funding could be provided by government appropriations perhaps at lower cost.

3. Why do charities change their mission and purpose? Again the instructor can use examples such as the March of Dimes for why charities decide to change their mission and purpose. In the case of the March of Dimes, the success of the organization with help from government and other organizations in finding a vaccine to prevent polio, led to the likely end of the organization. The March of Dimes had a viable fund raising organization including its name and its way of raising money, its staff and many supporters that would be dissipated if the organization was closed due to its success. The answer of finding a new purpose, reduction of birth defects, enabled the organization to continue its operation of this successful charity with a new purpose that would help humanity in the future.

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4. Should Help Hospitalized Veterans widen its services to disabled veterans? If so, How? Since HHV is already working with veterans hospitals and others providing services to veterans it might be more efficient to add other services to veterans if fund raising and providing of services to veterans might be done better if the purposes and the mission were broadened. Perhaps HHV could work closely with other organizations in providing services to blind veterans or handicapped veterans who have lost a limb or limbs.

5. How can the board of trustees of a charity such as HHV control fund raising expenses to make sure that they are not excessive? The first thing that could be done is to compare fund raising expenditures of this charity with other charities that raise funds. The statistics on charitable receipts and costs of fundraising are available through the Better Business Bureau, through the American Institute of Philanthropy, and through government agencies such as the Attorneys General in some states and through the public filings with the US Internal Revenue Service. Once this has been analyzed, then the board of trustees of the organization can set policies and goals to guide the management of the charity. Of course, this presumes that the board of trustees of the organization is made up of persons who wish to help the organization meet its mission and who wish that all funds raised be done so ethically.

6. How can the Board of Trustees of a charity such as HHV ensure that expenditures for salaries and expenses of staff of the organization be fair but not excessive? Again, the Board can look at published statistics from charities for guidance as to what is appropriate before the Board makes decisions on salaries and other compensation for staff of the charity.

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The Board can also call on professional compensation consultants for advice to the Board, which has the responsibility to set the salaries and other benefits for the staff of the organization. In some cases, so called charitable organizations may be run by the staff with the purpose of enriching the staff rather than meeting the purposes of the organization. An independent board not under the control of the staff is essential to see that this process is carried out with integrity. If the board is not doing its job in the governance of the charity, some states have regulatory processes that may enable the removal of the board by regulators. For example, the New York State Board of Regents may remove members of the board of an independent college or university if they do not act as expected for an independent board. In other cases, it may be necessary for the Attorney General of the state to bring a law suit against members of a board of trustees of a charity who do not fulfill their legal duties as an independent trustee and the court will decide whether or not any members of the board may be removed for negligence in performing their duties.

7. Is there a responsibility of government to regulate charities to ensure that there are not excessive expenditures in fund raising or in compensating employees of the charitable organization? Discussion on this topic can be very spirited. Some persons would believe that this should be left to the free market. Others will believe that government needs to regulate these activities to prevent fraud.

8. Design a strategic plan to recommend to the Board of Trustees of HHV in your role as a new member of the Board of Trustees of HHV. Should fund raising practices be changed? How? Why? Should compensation for staff be changed?

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How? Why? Should the CEO of the charity be replaced? Why (not)?

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